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Fifty-seven years ago, the noted contracts scholar John P. Dawson
stated:
[T]he modem American law of duress reflects the convergence
of several lines of growth, originally moving from sources quite
distinct. The symptom of this convergence has been an increas-
ing interplay and transfer of ideas. Its result has certainly not
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been a coherent body of doctrine, unified around some central
proposition; on the contrary, the conflict and confusion in re-
sults of decided cases seems greater than ever before.
2
Dawson's conclusion about "conflict and confusion" of results in actual
cases remains true today. Commentators over the decades since Dawson's
statement have repeated the finding. 3 Yet, the courts have not found a path out
of the dark forest. Even after the passage of half a century since Dawson's ob-
servations, the duress doctrine remains largely unusable, though courts fre-
quently attempt to use it. 4 The time has come for a coherent and usable duress
doctrine based on clear principles.
I. INTRODUCTION
The word "duress" historically has referred to two very different situa-
tions. In one situation, a party's manifestation of assent is the product of physi-
cal compulsion. A physically or mentally stronger party places another's hand
on the pen and guides the other party's signature. In such a situation, the con-
duct of signing the document is not the intentional act of the contracting party; it
is nonvolitional. Thus, the law does not view such conduct as an effective mani-
festation of consent. No contract is formed because, truly, the conduct is not the
product of the actor's will. Any ostensible contract is void.5 Such nonvolitional
2 John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 288
(1947).
3 See Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of Free Will Theory: A Proposed Tort Analy-
sis, 53 IOWA L. REV. 892, 892 (1968) ("The limits of the doctrine, however, are not clear, and the
courts have not used consistent standards for a finding of duress."). See also Julie Kostritsky,
Stepping Out of the Morass of Duress Cases: A Suggested Policy Guide, 53 ALBANY L. REV. 583,
589 (1989) ("the current law of duress is wholly unsatisfactory"); Hamish Stewart, A Formal
Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175 (1997); Sian E. Provost, Note, A De-
fense of a Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629
(1995); Daniel Tan, Case and Legislative Comment, Grounds of Economic Duress-Further
Clarification or Further Confusion, 2001 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 268.
4 See, e.g., Traystrnan, Coric & Keramidas v. Daigle, 855 A.2d 996 (Conn. Ct. App. 2004);
1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 847 A.2d 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004); Adams v.
Adams, 848 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (198 1). The illustration in the Restate-
ment is quite helpful. Illustration one states:
A presents to B, who is physically weaker than A, a written contract prepared
for B's signature and demands that B sign it. B refuses. A grasps B's hand
and compels B by physical force to write his name. B's signature is not effec-
tive as a manifestation of his assent, and there is no contract.
See also ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 30 (Princeton University Press 1987) (this situation is
"nonvolitional duress"). In Fairbanks v. Snow, 13 N.E. 596 (Mass. 1887), Justice Holmes dis-
cussed this form of duress, stating:
[Vol. 107
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situations are obviously rare. This type of duress is helpful as a contrast to the
second basic duress situation, which does not involve a complete constraint of
will.
The focus of this Article is on the second basic duress situation, the
paradigm for almost every modem duress claim. 6 In this situation the manifes-
tation of assent is indeed the product of the bargainer's body and mind. The
decision to assent, however, is the product of a threat by the other party. So a
mother agrees to pay money so that her son will not be hurt, as the other party to
the agreement has promised. Or a mother agrees to pay money so her son will
not be terminated from his job. With this form of duress, the resulting contract
is not void, but rather, has historically been viewed as voidable.7 While courts
have often described this form of duress as a situation in which the assenter acts
without free will,8 many commentators have noted that there may be no situa-
tion in which the assenter acts with any greater degree of free will. 9 In the ex-
amples above, the choices are, in fact, those of the mother, not those of someone
else imposed on her. 10  This situation of constrained choice, regardless of
No doubt, if the defendant's hand had been forcibly taken and compelled to
hold the pen and write her name, and the note had been carried off and deliv-
ered, the signature and delivery would not have been her acts; and if the signa-
ture and delivery had not been her acts, for whatever reason, no contract
would have been made, whether the plaintiff knew the facts or not.
Id at 598.
The criminal law, too, recognizes that the act is not the act of the person signing. There is no
criminal liability in such a setting. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962), quoted in note 42
infra.
6 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 30 ("Virtually all contract duress cases are of [this
type].").
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). Section 175 states in part: "If a
party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."
See, e.g., Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 450, 452 (Va. 1993) (duress exists
"when a defendant commits a wrongful act sufficient to prevent a plaintiff from exercising his free
will, thereby coercing the plaintiffs consent"). See also infra section IV.C. (discussing the courts'
treatment of the free will concept).
9 See, e.g., John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure 1, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 238 (1942).
See also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 94 (1981); Dawson, supra note 2, at 267.
10 See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 33-35; P.S. Atiyah, Economic Distress and the
'Overborne Will', 98 L.Q. REv. 197 (1982); Dalzell, supra note 9, at 238-40; Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943)[hereinafter Bargain-
ing]; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470, 476-77 (1923) [hereinafter Coercion]; Edwin W. Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the
Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 741-42 (1943).
See also Union Pac. R. v. Public Serv. Com'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70, 39 S. Ct. 24, 63 L. Ed. 131 (1918).
Justice Holmes stated: "It always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of
20051
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whether the threat is one of physical violence or, rather, economic conse-
quence," is the typical modem duress paradigm. It is a situation in which "the
agent is confronted with unwanted alternatives, but is quite capable of making
rational choices among them."' 12 In discussing the example of a highwayman,
Professor Morris Cohen noted that there is "freedom to accept the terms offered
or else take the consequences." 13 Cohen continued that "such choice is surely
the very opposite of what men value as freedom." 14
The problem in recent times, with regard to this second form of duress,
has been in determining in which situation the doctrine renders a contract unen-
forceable. In other words, what is legally cognizable duress for purposes of
contract law? More important, what should duress be for the purposes of con-
tract law?
The snapshot of the duress doctrine today is bothersome. Over and over
again modem day courts struggle with defining the parameters of the doctrine. 15
These courts state illogical or nonsensical tests for application of the doctrine
and then apply the tests conclusorily or with implausible or impossible explana-
tion of rationale. 16 Not surprisingly, the courts manifest a complete inability or
unwillingness to apply the doctrine to the facts in any sort of reasoned way.17
The result is a complete failure of the duress doctrine. First, courts
rarely find duress or even make a decision in favor of finding duress.18 In addi-
two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is
the characteristic of duress properly so called."
11 Situations of economic violence or physical violence should be analyzed in the same man-
ner. See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 237. A few cases appear to distinguish between duress and
economic duress. See, e.g., Mathias v. Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Golden v.
McDermott, Will & Emery, 702 N.E.2d 581 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
12 WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 9. See also Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist
Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 65, 74 (1985) (distinguishing constrained choice from "sheer mindless panic"); Mi-
chael Philips, Are CoercedAgreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 133 (1984).
13 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 569 (1933).
14 Id.
15 See also Note, supra note 3, at 892 ("The limits of the doctrine, however, are not clear, and
the courts have not used consistent standards for a finding of duress.").
16 See infra section IV.C. (discussing various "free will" tests applied by courts). See also
infra section V.D. (discussing the problematic treatment of the threat requirement of duress).
17 See Kostritsky, supra note 3, at 592 ("confusion prevails in duress law; consequently courts
cannot reach consistently sound results"); Note, supra note 3, at 896 ("These discrepancies in
decisional factors employed, together with the ambiguity of the common free will test, have con-
tributed to lack of predictability, inaccurate use of precedents, confusion between the functions of
judge and jury, and timidity in the extension of the duress doctrine.").
18 Many appellate decisions are reviews of grants of summary judgment motions. Courts
rarely find the summary judgment grant improper, a finding that would be in favor of duress while
[Vol. 107
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tion, the decisions of the courts are extraordinarily valueless as precedent; they
provide virtually no instruction as to application of the doctrine.
Because the courts have not had the benefit of the guidance a clearly ar-
ticulated standard provides, they have been forced to render analysis-free, result-
oriented decisions. In addition, the result courts have often chosen, a finding of
no duress and thus enforcement of the contract, 19 is an example of double-
dipping at the well of freedom of contract public policy. Not only has the value
of the freedom of contract been weighed in defining the parameters of the duress
doctrine narrowly, but also the courts have given weight to the freedom of con-
tract when evaluating the particular facts of each case. Thus, the test for the
existence of duress reflects the policy balance between fairness and the freedom
of contract and then the courts apply the test to the particular facts of particular
cases with special deference to the public policy of freedom of contract.
Upon evaluation of this state of affairs, two conclusions are possible:
that the duress doctrine should be eliminated or that the doctrine should be made
workable. The premise of this Article is that the duress doctrine can serve the
valuable goal of protecting the concept of voluntary action in entering into bar-
gains. Contract theorists of all stripes value this concept. No doctrine can en-
sure perfect voluntariness, but the duress doctrine can be a tool to condenm
situations in which choice is particularly egregiously constrained. The doctrine
and the courts applying it must not be expected to do too much, however, nor
can the doctrine's application be too complex. So what steps can be taken to
assist the survival and vitality of the duress doctrine?
not actually a finding of duress.
19 See, e.g., Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32 (I" Cir. 2002); VKK
Corp. v. Nat'l Football League, 244 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2001); Profl Serv. Network, Inc. v. Am.
Alliance Holding Co., 238 F.3d 897 (7 h Cir. 2001); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir.
2000); Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 187 F.3d 1221 (10 t' Cir. 1999); Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc., 181 F.3d 1163 (10" h Cir. 1999); Strickland Tower Maint., Inc. v. AT & T Communications,
Inc., 128 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1997); Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472 (51h Cir. 1996); McCallum
Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1995).
Of published state cases in the years 1996 to 2003 inclusive, duress was an issue in eighty-eight.
See infra section IV.A. In only nine of these cases did the court decide the matter in favor of the
duress claim. See Inter-Tel, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 985 P.2d 596 (Ariz. 1999); Krantz v. BT Visual
Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Court,
954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998); Bath v. Hi-Tech Int'l, Inc., 704 So. 2d 292 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Young
v. Anne Arundel County, 807 A.2d 651 (Md. Ct. App. 2002); In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d
348 (N.H. 2003); Blumenthal v. Tener, 642 N.Y.S.2d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Radford v. Keith,
584 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 591 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2004); In re Adoption of
B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In only two of these cases did a court affirm a find-
ing of duress. See Bath v. Hi-Tech Int'l, Inc., 704 So. 2d 292 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Radford v.
Keith, 584 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), afld, 591 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2004).
20 See infra section IV.B. (discussing the effect of the freedom of contract).
2005]
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First, any test for duress stated in terms of the existence of free will
must be scrapped in favor of a "no reasonable alternative" test.21 The question
should not be whether the threatened party exercised free will, but rather
whether that party had any reasonable alternative to the path urged by the other
party. As mentioned above, courts have long been willing to apply the duress
doctrine to constrained choice situations. Those situations, however, involve the
exercise of free will, albeit constrained free will. It is impossible to grasp how a
court can use an absolute test for the presence or absence of free will and yet
find duress in such a fettered free will situation. Even so, courts have used the
zero-sum analysis of the absence or presence of free will.22 In addition, such a
test is incredibly vague. How does one determine the presence of free will?
Perhaps a situation exhibits more or less free will but a complete absence of free
will is difficult to determine. As one might imagine, explanatory analysis is
usually absent from courts' free will determinations. Free will analysis should
be abandoned because it provides an environment that, in effect, encourages
courts to make result-oriented decisions. The notion of "no reasonable alterna-
tive" better captures the idea of constrained choice and is a standard courts have
the ability to apply once courts understand the idea of reasonableness in con-
text.
23
Second, duress should be defined to regulate situations of constrained
choice, not situations in deficiencies of decision-making capability that might
best be considered with the doctrine of undue influence. In short, duress and
undue influence are separate doctrines and maintaining the division of doctrines
can maximize clarity of analysis and thus clarity of court decisions. In addition,
the doctrines should be kept separate to deal with different situations. The clas-
sic duress situation has been and ought to be one in which the actor fully com-
prehends the alternatives, carefully considers the alternatives, and selects one
alternative. Situations of limited decisional capacity or flawed decisional capac-
ity are not duress and should be irrelevant to duress. Courts should not use the
duress doctrine to police undue influence on decision-making ability; the doc-
trine of undue influence serves that purpose.
While a blending of the two doctrines may be attractive, ostensibly as a
method of obtaining a seamless web of fairness, much is lost with a combina-
tion. Duress and undue influence address two separate sorts of contracting im-
21 See discussion in section IV.B. & section V.A. infra.
22 See infra section IV.C.
23 See, e.g., Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4 t" 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Nobel v. White, 783 A.2d 1145 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country
Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2001); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993);
Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall Co., 572 S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 2002). See generally discussion in
section V.A. infra.
24 See infra section V.B. (discussing the inappropriateness of undue influence factors in a
duress analysis).
[Vol. 107
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perfections. When the two doctrines are combined, situations that would have
fit the traditional duress doctrine-situations of truly constrained choice-fail to
prove the case of unenforceability if undue influence factors are absent. In a
Venn diagram of traditional duress situations and traditional undue duress situa-
tions, each doctrine is a circle with only slight overlap. The parts of the two
circles not overlapping represent the situations that may no longer be unenforce-
able if the doctrines are combined,25 and thus aggregate fairness is reduced.
26
Third, duress is obviously a fairness doctrine. Yet, the duress doctrine
must not be used to directly regulate the substantive fairness of a deal. 27 His-
torically, the doctrine has had a process focus. The notion has been that certain
bargains are flawed because of unfair constraints on the decision maker. To
survive, the doctrine must remain process focused. While process fairness hasS28
the side effect of regulating the substantive fairness of bargains, duress should
not be defined or applied with the goal of regulating the substantive fairness of
the bargain. 29  Much of the contract theory of the twentieth century has sug-
gested that substantive fairness analysis would be an improvement on the duress
doctrine. This scholarship coincided with the legal realist or modernist
25 So, for example, no duress could exist in the case of Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp.,
272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971), because the case does not involve a threatened party with a limited
capacity to reach a decision. Rather, the threatened party was a corporation and the threat in-
volved business dealings. Yet, the New York Court of Appeals found duress. In contrast, the case
of Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898), might present facts suggesting limited capacity
to reach a decision and also constrained choice. See further discussion of these cases in section II.
infra.
26 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See also
discussion in Section V.B. infra.
27 See infra section V.C. (discussing the inappropriateness of a substantive fairness analysis in
duress).
28 The great philosopher Hobbes wrote that a voluntary contract could not be unfair by defini-
tion. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Chapter 15 (1660). Wertheimer believes that a voluntary
contract can, indeed, be substantively unfair.
While it may be difficult to establish the independent value of goods and services, it may be said
that "right you are as right you think you are" is no more valid here than anywhere else. An unfair
exchange may, for example, result from market imperfections or from one's desire to show affec-
tion for the other party. Thus, just as a coerced agreement can be fair (with respect to the value
exchanged), a voluntary agreement can be unfair. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 22. See also
Dawson, supra note 2, at 285-87 (duress is usually a situation of unequal exchange and often a
situation involving unequal bargaining position).
29 See John P. Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: 1, 45 MICH. L. REV. 571, 598 (1947)
(suggesting that the fairness of the result of the bargain can and should be relevant); Hale, Bar-
gaining, supra note 10 (espousing the position that control of the bargaining power of the strong
might produce more of the commodity of freedom of contract for the weak and that this result
might be beneficial to all).
30 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 2, at 282-83 (discussing fairness consideration); Dawson,
supra note 29, at 598 (espousing consideration of the justness of the resulting transaction); Finga-
2005]
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movement throughout all aspects of contract law. 31 In the best of all possible
worlds, perhaps a move to substantive fairness analysis would be optimal. But,
unfortunately, the treatment of the duress doctrine in the twentieth century indi-
cates that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Though the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states a substantive fairness test,32 on the whole, the
courts have refused to review bargains for fairness. 33 Such is a difficult chore
and one with which courts are uncomfortable. 34 Apparently, courts continue to
see review of the substance of a contract as an affront to the freedom of con-
tract. 35 Other doctrines, such as unconscionability, allow for substantive bar-
gain regulation. 36 The duress doctrine, however, may be applied more appropri-
ately to traditional duress situations if courts do not view it as a doctrine requir-
ing a substantive review of the deal in question. A requirement of substantive
review may scare courts away from the doctrine entirely.
rette, supra note 12, at 71-82 (arguing for a fairness analysis).
31 See Joseph M. Perillo, Screed for a Film & Pillar of Classical Contract Law: Shuey v.
United States, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 915 (2002).
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981), which states:
A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and (a) the
threatened act would harm the recipient amnd would not significantly benefit
the party making the threat, (b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the
manifestation of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the
party making the threat, or (c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power
for illegitimate ends.
33 Very few courts have even mentioned the fairness language of the Restatement. See Shuf-
ford v. Integon Indem. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Ala 1999); American Life Ins. Co. v.
Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Del. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir. 2001)
(table); In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Vail/ Arrowhead, Inc.
v. Dist. Court, 954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998); Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757 (Md. Ct. App.
1978); Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 62 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Maust
v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., 614 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 54
P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993); Mach. Hauling, Inc. v.
Steel, 384 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1989).
34 See Suwannee Swifty Stores, Inc. v. NationsBank, N.A., 536 S.E.2d 299, 303 (Ga. C1. App.
2000) (quoting Miller, Stevenson & Steinichen v. Fayette County, 380 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989)). "'One may not void a contract on grounds of duress merely because he entered into
it with reluctance, the contract is very disadvantageous to him, the bargaining power of the parties
was unequal or there was some unfairness in the negotiations preceding the agreement."'
35 See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 237. "One of the most frequently and emphatically declared
axioms of contract law is that our courts are not concerned with the equivalence of the considera-
tion given for a promise. But doubts are growing of late years."
36 See U.C. C. § 2-302. Section 2-302 states in part:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
[Vol. 107
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Fourth, the duress doctrine, historically, has been a regulator of fairness
of the bargaining process and should continue to do so. This is not to say that in
all cases of duress, the bargain is substantively unfair. Nor can one say that all
bargains from which duress is absent are substantively fair. Yet, absence of
fairness in the bargaining process generally indicates absence of substantive
fairness and presence of fairness in the bargaining process generally indicates
substantive fairness. 37 Thus, bargains in which an actor's choice is constrained
unfairly must be the target of the doctrine. Courts should recognize that the
bargaining process is fatally flawed if there is constrained choice and the con-
straint is caused by a threat violative of criminal or tort law, a threat violative of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an existing contractual relation-
ship, a threat that is a bad faith use of civil process, or, lastly, a threat to pursue
• 38
criminal prosecution. Any bargain that is the product of these threats when the
threatened party has no reasonable alternative to the plan of the threatener is a
product of procedural unfairness.
39
A duress doctrine that incorporates these four suggestions protects
against constrained choice and thus should be favored by theorists who value
such choice as a facet of autonomy. Likewise, the doctrine should appeal to
consequentialist thinkers who value the parties' relatively unconstrained choice
for the benefit that choice renders the market and therefore society in general.
While this Article does not embrace a full-fledged substantive fairness analysis,
the approach suggested by the Article is an indirect regulator of fairness, espe-
cially regarding the inclusion of lack of good faith in a contractual relationship
as a category of threats creating unfair constraint on the threatened party. The
rule's more obvious edges ought to provide a clearer and more obvious analysis
for courts to apply.
Section II of this Article sets out the basic outline of the duress doctrine
as it exists today. Section III discusses the approach of the Restatement (First)
of Contracts40 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.4 1 Section IV dis-
cusses how the courts have treated the doctrine, especially in recent years, in
terms of ultimate result reached. In addition, this section critically evaluates
tests applied and analytical frameworks used by the courts. In Section V the
Article discusses the four suggested improvements to the duress doctrine: (1)
that a "no reasonable alternative" test be applied in place of a free will test; (2)
37 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 22. Hobbes said that all voluntary contracts are in fact
fair. See HOBBES, supra note 28.
38 See infra section V.D.2. (discussing the proper parameters of the threat requirement).
39 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 21 ("While we would expect that a legitimate process
would tend to produce legitimate results, process and result capture different dimensions of the
morality of agreements."). See also Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
40 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 492-494 (1932).
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981).
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that the duress doctrine not be confused with or melded with the undue influ-
ence doctrine; (3) that the duress doctrine not be used to directly police substan-
tive fairness; and (4) that courts recognize duress when the situation involves
not only "no reasonable alternative," but also a threat violative of criminal or
tort law, a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an existing
contractual relationship, a bad faith use of civil process, or a threat to pursue
criminal prosecution. Section VI concludes that these changes should serve to
save and improve the duress doctrine.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
Contractual duress at an early time did not suffer the identity crisis it
now faces. The doctrine paralleled the criminal doctrine of duress, at least with
regard to the type of activities that could be the basis of the constraint.4 2 A
party could avoid a contractual obligation on the basis of duress only if the con-
straint on that party's decision-making was in the form of a fear of death or seri-
ous bodily harm or actual imprisonment.4 3 A contract entered into at gunpoint
was a contract voidable on the basis of duress. But, as Blackstone stated,
A fear of battery ... is no duress; neither is the fear of having
one's house burned, or one's goods taken away or destroyed, be-
cause in these cases, should the threat be performed, a man may
42 Duress in criminal law has traditionally required:
(1) The defendant must have no reasonable opportunity to escape from the co-
ercive situation.
(2) The defendant must be threatened with significant harm-death or serious
bodily injury.
(3) The threatened harm must be illegal.
(4) The threat must be of imminent harm.
(5) The defendant must not have placed herself voluntarily in a situation in
which she could expect to be subject to coercion, as is the case when a person
joins a violent criminal organization.
Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARiz. L. REV.
251, 254 (1995). The criminal law has seen some liberalization of the duress defense as a result
of the effect of the Model Penal Code. Section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code states, in part:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a per-
son of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962). See also State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977) (evaluat-
ing the traditional approach in light of the Model Penal Code approach). See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7 (4 Ed. 2003).
43 See also Note, supra note 3, at 893 (discussing the history of duress). See generally Daw-
son, supra note 2, at 254-62 (providing a detailed history of the common law of duress).
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have satisfaction by recovering equivalent damages: but no
suitable atonement can be made for the loss of life or limb.
44
The first recognition that the duress doctrine could apply in situations of eco-
nomic threat came in the form of situations that became known as "duress of
goods" cases. In a classic "duress of goods" case, a bargainer threatens to with-
hold delivery of goods to the owner of the goods unless the owner agrees to a
demand. The demand is usually a payment of money.45 As early as 1732, an
English court recognized the situation as one in which the duress doctrine ap-
plied. 46 In that case a lender of money refused to release to the owner the prop-
erty pledged as collateral for the loan unless the owner of the property agreed to
pay an illegal rate of interest. 47 The court noted that the owner might need the
goods immediately and that "an action of trover would not do his business.
48
American courts readily accepted the application of the duress doctrine to the
"duress of goods" scenario.
49
44 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 131, quoted in JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS § 9.2, at 316 (5t' Ed. 2003). For an early case in the United States stating a restric-
tive view of duress, see McDonald v. Carlton, I N.M. 172 (1857). In a case involving a soldier
who reenlisted to get out of jail and then claimed that the reenlistment was flawed because of
duress, the court stated that duress was "'actual or threatened violence or restraint of a man's
person, contrary to law ... sufficient to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness." Id.
at 176-77. At least one modem Indiana court has an extremely restrictive view of duress. In a
case involving a court-approved custody agreement, a mother claimed that the agreement should
be set aside because it was the product of duress. The court found no evidence of duress, stating,
"'there must be an actual or threatened violence or restraint of a man's person, contrary to law, to
compel him to enter into a contract or discharge one."' In re Paternity of K.R.H., 784 N.E.2d 985,
990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Rutter v. Excel Indus., Inc., 438 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982)).
45 See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 241. See also Dawson, supra note 2, at 255-56 (discussing the
"duress of goods" cases and noting that the objective in these cases was "ensuring the freedom of
the individual will").
46 Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732). See also Dalzell, supra
note 9, at 241. Dalzell notes that the doctrine may have existed even earlier and discusses Sum-
mer v. Ferryman, 11 Mod. 201, 88 Eng. Rep. 989 (Q.B. 1709), in this regard. See generally Daw-
son, supra note 2, at 255-56 (noting that the objective in these cases was "ensuring the freedom of
the individual will").
47 Astley, 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732).
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Reed, 13 Me. 357 (1836); Quinnett v. Washington, 10 Mo. 53
(1846); Sasportas v. Jennings, I Bay 470 (S.C. 1795). Cadwell v. Higginbottham, 151 P. 315
(N.M. 1915). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 893 (discussing the development of the recog-
nition of "duress of goods"). See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 241-42 (discussing acceptance of the
"duress of goods" notion by American courts).
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In the 1800s another setting in which courts were willing to apply the
duress doctrine emerged.50 These cases involved common carriers5 1 or public
utilities such as electricity companies, 52 gas companies,53 and water compa-
nies. 54 These companies would refuse service unless the customer would agree
to pay a fee in excess of established rates. 55 Courts viewed such conduct as
duress.56 Though courts did not inquire into alternative sources of the commod-
ity or service, there was generally no need to do so because these carriers and
utilities wielded monopoly power. 57 Interestingly, these decisions were in fur-
therance of a new goal in contract law: remedying the economic disparity of the
contractors.
58
Gradually, courts enlarged the situations in which the duress doctrine
might apply, recognizing that all sorts of economic pressure might create a prob-
lematic contract. An example of this expansion is the case of Austin Instrument,
50 See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 243-46; Dawson, supra note 2, at 258.
51 See, e.g., California Adjustment Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 175 P. 682 (Cal. 1918); The
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Chicago, Vermillion & Wilmington Coal Co., 79 111. 121 (1875);
McGregor v. Erie Ry., 35 N.J.L. 89 (1871); Peters, Ricker & Co. v. R.R., 42 Ohio St. 275 (1884).
52 See, e.g., Manhattan Milling Co v. Manhattan Gas & Elec. Co., 225 P. 86 (Kan. 1924); City
of Boston v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 136 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1922); Piedmont Power & Light
Co. v. L. Banks Holt Mfg. Co., 111 S.E. 623 (N.C. 1922)
53 See, e.g., Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. Anthony, 58 N.E. 868 (Ind. Ct. App.
1900); New Orleans Gaslight & Banking Co. v. Paulding, 12 Rob. 378 (La. 1845); City of
Saginaw v. Consumers Power Co., 8 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1943).
54 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 75 N.E. 803 (II. 1905); B. &
B. Amusement Enters. Inc v. City of Boston, 8 N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 1937); Barnes Laundry Co. v.
City of Pittsburgh, 109 A. 535 (Pa. 1920).
55 See, e.g., Newland v. Buncombe Turnpike Co., 26 N.C. 372 (1844) (excessive tolls charged
for use of turnpike). See also Parker v. Great Western Ry., 7 Man. & G. 253, 135 Eng. Rep. 107
(C.P. 1844) (carrier refused to receive goods for shipment unless excessive fees were paid).
56 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 75 N.E. 803 (11. 1905); B. &
B. Amusement Enters. Inc v. City of Boston, 8 N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 1937); Panton v. Duluth Gas &
Water Co., 52 N.W. 527 (1892); St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. St. Louis, 37 S.W. 525 (Mo. 1897);
Piedmont Power & Light Co. v. L. Banks Holt Mfg. Co., 111 S.E. 623 (N.C. 1922). See also
Dalzell, supra note 9, at 243 ("[w]hen the question has come up as a problem in duress, the courts
have been practically unanimous in holding such payments involuntary and recoverable").
57 See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 243-46 (discussing the application of the duress doctrine to
monopolists). See also Dawson, supra note 2, at 259 ("Inequality of bargaining power, the inevi-
table product of state-conferred monopoly, was used to justify this extension of the doctrine of
economic duress.").
58 See Dawson, supra note 2, at 258-59. Dawson noted, "The economic and political power of
the railroads made them the first focal point of the new doctrine." See also Dalzell, supra note 9,
at 244 ("In these decisions the courts talk much of the inequality of the parties as a weighty argu-
ment for relief.").
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Inc. v. Loral Corp.59 The United States Navy awarded Loral Corporation a con-
tract to produce radar sets.60 The contract contained a schedule for delivery, a
liquidated damage clause to deal with late deliveries, and a cancellation clause
in the event that Loral was unable to perform adequately. 61 Loral selected Aus-
tin Instrument to produce twenty-three of the forty 6?recision gear components
necessary for Loral to manufacture the radar sets. While Loral was in the
midst of performing on this first contract, Loral obtained another radar set con-. 63
tract with the Navy. Loral solicited bids for the supply of the forty parts for
the second contract. 64 Austin responded with two demands. Austin stated that
it would cease shipment of the parts owed for the first contract (1) if Loral did
not agree to use Austin Instrument as the supplier for all forty of the parts on the
second contract and (2) if Loral did not agree to price increases on the parts for
the first contract. 65 Austin Instrument in fact did stop delivery just as it had
promised. 66 Loral sought other suppliers but determined that no other supplier
could perform in a time consistent with the demands of Loral's contracts with
the Navy. 67 Finally, Loral agreed to Austin Instrument's demands, stating:
We have feverishly surveyed other sources of supply and find
that because of the prevailing military exigencies, were they to
start from scratch as would have to be the case, they could not
even remotely begin to deliver on time to meet the delivery re-
quirements established by the Government .... Accordingly,
we are left with no choice or alternative but to meet your condi-
tions.
68
After the last delivery from Austin Instrument, Loral notified Austin of Loral's
intent to recover the amount Loral paid in price increases. 69 Loral then followed
up on its statement by filing suit.
70
59 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
60 Id. at 535.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 272 N.E.2d at 534.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 534-35.
69 Id. at 536.
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The lower court found no duress, 7 1 but the Court of Appeals of New
York disagreed. 72 The Court began by noting that a contract is voidable on the
basis of duress "when it is established that the party making the claim was
forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of his
free will." 73 The court then accepted that a threat by one party to breach a con-
tract by not delivering the subject of the contract was wrongful. 74 Such a threat
could be the basis of a duress claim if there was no other source of supply for
the goods and the usual remedy for breach of contract would not be adequate.
75
The Court then applied these principles to the facts, stating that Austin's
threat "deprived Loral of its free will. ' 76 The Court noted that Loral faced stag-
gering expenses in the form of liquidated damages if its deliveries to the Navy
were late, that Loral did a significant amount of business with the Navy and did
not want to jeopardize that relationship, and that it was therefore "perfectly rea-
sonable for Loral . . . to consider itself in an emergency, duress situation."
77
Further, Loral adequately demonstrated that it had no other supply of parts for
the radar sets and that an action for breach of contract against Austin Instrument
would have been an inadequate remedy since Loral would have to obtain parts
in a timely manner or face the consequences of failing to perform on the Navy
contracts. 
78
This case presents facts far afield from Blackstone's statement of the
earlier notion of duress that required a threat of physical force.79 While the facts
are similar to a "duress of goods" case, the Loral case is not a traditional "duress
of goods" case. Loral was not the owner of the parts at the time that Austin In-
strument withheld them. This case is an example of courts' willingness to ac-
cept a broader notion of the type of threat that can support a finding of duress.
Another case exhibiting this willingness to expand the situations recog-
nizable as duress is Silsbee v. Webber. In Silsbee, a woman sought to have a
70 Id.
71 272 N.E.2d at 535.
72 Id. at 536 ("We find without any support in the record the conclusion reached by the courts
below that Loral failed to establish that it was the victim of economic duress.").
73 Id. at 535.
74 Id.
75 Id
76 Id. at 536.
77 272 N.E.2d at 536.
78 Id. at 537.
79 See supra note 44.
80 50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898).
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contract assigning her share of her father's estate set aside on the basis that she
agreed to the assignment under duress. 81 She claimed that she signed because
the other party threatened to tell her husband, who apparently had mental diffi-
culties, that her son had stolen from the other party. The court held that the
lower court acted improperly in directing a verdict against the woman and that
the matter should have been left to the jury.83 Justice Holmes, writing for the
court, stated:
If a contract is extorted by brutal and wicked means, and a
means which derives its immunity, if it have immunity, solely
from the law's distrust of its own powers of investigation, in our
opinion the contract may be avoided by the party to whom the
undue influence has been applied.
84
Once again, the threat is not one of physical injury or traditional duress of
goods. Yet, the court was willing to accept the situation as one that might pre-
sent a defense of duress. Unfortunately, the courts are, and have been, unsure of
the bounds of this broader notion of duress for quite some time.
III. TiE RESTATEMENTS
The Restatement (First) of Contracts attempted to define the duress doc-
trine. Section 492 stated that duress is:
(a) any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation
of apparent assent by another to a transaction without his voli-
tion, or
(b) any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct
that induces another to enter into a transaction under the influ-
ence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and
judgment, if the threat was intended or should reasonably have
been expected to operate as an inducement.
85
Part (a) referred to the rare situation mentioned earlier86 in which the
conduct that constitutes assent to the bargain is not the product of the actor's
81 Id. at 556.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 557.
84 Id. at 556.
85 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) or CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
86 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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volition as would be the case when someone holds the actor's hand to the paper
and forces a signature.87  Both the Restatement (First) and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts agree on the treatment contracts formed in this way
should receive-the contracts are void.
88
Part (b) of the Restatement (First) dealt with the form of duress that re-
sults in a voidable contract-the form of duress in which a party must decide to
contract or not to contract while facing a threat of negative consequences.89 The
Restatement (First) set forth that there must be a "wrongful threat" that "pre-
cludes" the exercise of "free will and judgment" and therefore is causally re-
lated to the inability to exercise free will.9 1 The Restatement (First) did not
attempt to define when one is precluded from exercising free will and judg-
ment92 but did clarify that the standard is a subjective one.93 With regard to the
nature of the threat, the Restatement (First), in section 493, provided a laundry
list of threats that could be the basis of duress but then section 493 ended with
the great catch-all, "any other wrongful acts." 94 In an attempt to explain, a Re-
87 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Wertheimer refers to this situation as one of non-
volitional duress. See WERTHEIMER, note 5, at 30.
98 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 494 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 174 (1981).
89 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. b (1932).
90 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. f (1932). "T]he fear must be a cause
inducing entrance into a transaction, and though not necessarily the sole cause, it must be one
without which the transaction would not have occurred."
91 Id.
92 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. e (1932). "[T]here is no line of abso-
lute demarcation between fear that deprives a person of free will and judgment, and lesser degrees
of fear...."
93 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. a (1932). Comment a states in part:
The test of what act or threat produces the required degree of fear is not objec-
tive. The threat need not be such as would put a brave man, or even a man of
ordinary firmness, in fear. The question is rather, did it put one entering into
the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and
judgment.
94 Section 493 states:
Duress may be exercised by
(a) personal violence or a threat thereof, or
(b) imprisonment, or threat of imprisonment, except where the imprisonment
brought about or threatened is for the enforcement of a civil claim, and is
made in good faith in accordance with law, or
(c) threats of physical injury, or of wrongful imprisonment or prosecution of a
husband; wife, child, or other near relative, or
(d) threats of wrongfully destroying, injuring, seizing or withholding land or
other things, or
16
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statement (First) comment stated that acts may be wrongful even if not criminal
or tortious or in violation of a contractual duty if the acts involve "abuse of legal
remedies" or the acts "are wrongful in a moral sense."
95
Courts following this definition would, in effect, perform a two-part in-
quiry. First, a court would ask and answer the question of whether there was a
wrongful threat. Second, a court would determine whether the wrongful threat
caused a loss of free will. Courts have long used, and continue to use, this basic
two-part framework: one part dealing with the nature of the constraint caused
by one of the parties and one part dealing with the effect of the constraint on the, • 96
other party's choice. Courts have, of course, disagreed on the substance of the
two parts.97 While many courts have followed the teaching of section 492 by
focusing on the presence or absence of free will, courts have not uniformly ap-
plied the Restatement (First) version of the test for the type of threat that may be
a basis for a valid duress claim.
98
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts attempts to improve upon the
Restatement (First). With regard to the voidable contract situation, the Restate-
ment (Second) significantly modified the approach. The Restatement (Second)
replaced the free will notion of the Restatement (First) with the idea that if the
victim has "no reasonable alternative," the contract is voidable if an "improper
threat" causes the situation of "no reasonable alternative." 99  The comment
(e) any other wrongful acts ....
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 493 (1932).
95 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. g (1932).
96 See, e.g-, Young v. Anne Arundel County, 807 A.2d 651, 692 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)
("To establish duress there must be a wrongful act which strips the individual of the ability to
utilize his free will."); Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P,3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2001) ("[D]uress exists when-
ever a person is induced, by the unlawful act of another, to perform some act under circumstances
which deprive him of the exercise of free will." (quoting In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo.
1989))). See also Krilich v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002);
Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 450 (Va. 1993).
97 See infra section IV.C. and section V.A. (discussing treatment of the free will part of the
inquiry). See infra section V.D. (discussing the threat part of the inquiry).
98 For example, some courts state that a threat, to be a basis for duress, must be unlawful. See,
e.g., Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir.
1990) ("unlawful act"); Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d
514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("unlawfully made" threat); Gubitz v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 692
N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (The court refused to apply the duress doctrine because
the party's conduct was not "illegal," stating: "It is well established that where the alleged menace
was ... to stop performance under a contract or to exercise a legal right, there is no actionable
duress."), See also discussion infra section VI.D.
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
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states that the free will approach is flawed because of "vagueness and impracti-
cability."1
00
The Restatement (Second) defined an "improper threat" in section
176(1) as one of the following: (1) a threat of a crime or a tort, (2) a threat that is
a crime or tort, (3) a threat of criminal prosecution, (4) bad faith threat to use
civil process, or (5) a threat to breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing in a
contract relationship. 10 1 In addition, the Restatement (Second) section 176(2)
stated:
A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair
terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not
significantly benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation
of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the
party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegiti-
mate ends.1
02
The Restatement (Second) also allows for use of the duress doctrine when a
third party causes the duress "unless the other party to the transaction in good
faith and without reason to know of the duress either gives value or relies mate-
rially on the transaction."
103
In many areas of contract law, the Restatements have been extraordinar-
ily influential. 10 4 Often a court adopts a Restatement section as the law of that
jurisdiction on a particular point. 105 The courts have not embraced as heartily
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1981). See also Andreini v. Hult-
gren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (discussing the changes made by the Restatement (Second)).
101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) (1981).
104 See Gregory E. Maggs, lpse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 508 (1998).
1o5 For example, many courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 version
of the promissory estoppel doctrine. See, e.g., Chapman v. Boman, 381 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1978);
Chesus v. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Talley v. Teamsters Local No. 377, 357
N.E.2d 44 (Ohio 1976). See also Benedetto v. Wanat, 829 A.2d 901 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003);
United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999); Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mort-
gage, Inc., 75 P.3d 640 (Wyo. 2003).
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the Restatement definitions of the duress doctrine. 10 6 While many courts still
use the language of the free will analysis, which is a part of the Restatement
(First) definition, long after the publication of the Restatement (Second), some
courts have used the "no reasonable alternative" concept of the Restatement
(Second) in addition to the free will analysis 107 or in place of it. 108  In addition,
some courts have analyzed the threat in terms similar to the definition of an im-
proper threat found in section 176(1) of the Restatement (Second).l°9 Very few,
however, have used the fairness factors in section 176(2) of the Restatement
(Second).110  Some courts use a definition of threat not in accord with either
Restatement. 
111
106 But see In re Marriage of Speigel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 175(1) in dealing with a prenuptial contract).
107 See, e.g., Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480, 498 (D. Del. 1999), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision) ("a release may be void
for duress where a party's manifestation of assent is induced by (1) an improper threat, (2) which
overcomes the party's free will and (3) leaves the party with no reasonable alternative to protect
his interest"); Leonard v. Univ. of Del., 204 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (D. Del. 2002) ("To prove du-
ress, Leonard must demonstrate: (1) an improper threat, (2) which overcame his free will, and (3)
left him with no reasonable alternative to protect his interest."). See also Todd v. Blue Ridge
Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (W.D. Va. 2001) . The court stated: "[T]he court
shall assume that the defendants' acts were wrongful. Furthermore, the court shall accept the
plaintiffs statement that her will was overcome." Yet, the court later noted that the coercive threat
must leave the plaintiff "without any reasonable alternative." (quoting King v. Donnkermy, Inc.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000)).
108 See In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). In Speigel the court decided
that the lower court was wrong in finding the prenuptial contract unenforceable on the basis of
duress. The court found that the bargainer had the reasonable though embarrassing option of
canceling the wedding. See also Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (the court
adopted the Restatement (Second) approach); Mach. Hauling, Inc. v. Steel, 384 S.E.2d 139, 142
(W. Va. 1989) ("Recently, courts have tended to avoid the term 'free will' as applied to the victim,
but instead have utilized the concept that the victim had 'no reasonable alternative."').
109 See, e.g., Andreini, 860 P.2d at 921 ("We agree with this reasoning and explicitly adopt the
legal standards of duress set forth in sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts."). But see Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480, 498 (D. Del. 1999), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision) (noting that Delaware
does not follow section 176(1) of the Restatement (Second) regarding the breach of the duty of
good faith).
11o Only a few published opinions have applied section 176(2). See Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v.
Dist. Court, 954 P.2d 608, 612-13 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (the court quoted all of section 176 and
remanded for consideration in light of section 176); Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 320,
328 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (the court noted that no New Mexico court had applied section 176(2)
but because it would "fruitfully be applied to resolve this case and appears well-grounded," the
court used it to conclude that a case for duress had not been made); Maust v. Bank One Columbus,
N.A., 614 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (the court relied upon section 176 to deny sum-
mary judgment); Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 54 P.3d 1131, 1137 (Utah 2002) (finding no section
176(2) factors applicable); Andreini, 860 P.2d at 921 (the court reversed the grant of summary
judgment because there was evidence that an improper threat as defined in section 176(2)(b) had
occurred). In Shufford v. Integon Indem. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1299 (M.D. Ala. 1999), the
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Courts have not recognized duress when a third party causes the threat
even though section 175(2) of the Restatement (Second) espouses this view. In
fact, courts affirmatively hold to the contrary. 112 For example, in Kosawska v.
court quoted section 176(2) and commented that section 176(2) "appears to encompass the con-
cept of 'economic duress"'. Yet, in the analysis the court relied on the Alabama definition of du-
ress as 'wrongful acts or threats"' which cause 'financial distress"' leaving no 'reasonable alter-
native"'. Id (quoting Int'l Paper v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 562 (Ala. 1985). See also In re
Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (the court set aside property
and support provisions of a marital dissolution on the basis of duress, quoting section 176 in a
footnote); Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (the court quoted a
Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second) but did not apply it); Steel, 384 S.E.2d at 142 n.7 (W.
Va. 1989) (quoting section 176 but ultimately finding no duress because duress cannot be based
on conduct that the party has a legal right to do; such a position is inconsistent with section
176(2)).
III See, e.g., In re Paternity of K.R.H., 784 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Rutter v. Excell Indus., Inc., 438 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)) ("'there must be an
actual or threatened violence or restraint of a man's person, contrary to law, to compel him to enter
into a contract or discharge one"'). See infra section IV.C. and section V. (discussing the various
approaches taken by courts).
112 See, e.g., Andes v. Albano, 853 S.W.2d 936, 942-43 (Mo. 1993) ("however, any allegation
that her own counsel pressured her to sign the release simply cannot be attributed to opposing
counsel."); Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund v. Bryden House, Ltd. P'ship, 719 N.E.2d
646, 652 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Blodgett v. Blodgett, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (Ohio 1990)) ("'To
avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must prove coercion by the other party to the con-
tract. It is not enough to show that one assented merely because of difficult circumstances that are
not the fault of the other party."'); Dockery v. Estate of Massey, 958 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997) (the actions complained of were not those of the opposing party so no duress finding
was possible); ABB Kraflwerke Aktiengesellschaft v. Brownsville Barge & Crane, Inc., 115
S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. App. 2003) (refusing to recognize a threat by a third party as a basis for a
duress claim); H.R.N., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 102 S.W.3d 205, 216 (Tex. App. 2003) ("Further-
more, economic duress may be claimed only when the party against whom it is claimed was re-
sponsible for the claimant's financial distress."); Lee v. Lee, 44 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. App. 2001)
(in a case involving the enforceability of a property settlement agreement, the party claiming
duress relied upon actions and statements of that party's own attorney as a basis of the duress; the
court clarified that the duress must be imposed by the other party to the contract, not a third party).
See also W.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting City of Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (a document in
which a mother surrendered parental rights was not the product of duress because there was no
"'improper and coercive conduct of the opposite side"'; the claim was based primarily on conduct
of the mother's own attorney, not the party on the other side of the agreement).
Other courts define duress clearly to require the duress to be imposed by the other party to the
contract. See, e.g., Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 307, 312 (Idaho 2002) ("A
party claiming economic duress must prove ... that the circumstances were the result of coercive
acts of the other party."); In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 797 (N.H. 2002) (quoting Goodwin R.R.
v. State, 517 A.2d 823, 830 (N.H. 1986) ("'To establish duress, a party must show ... that the
coercive circumstances were the result of the other party's acts ...."'); Boud, 54 P.3d at 1136
("duress exists when a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative"' (quoting Andreini, 860 P.2d at 921));
Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2001) ("such circumstances are the result of coercive
acts of the other party").
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Khan,113 an automobile owner settled with a repair shop for damage to her
automobile. 114 The owner then claimed that the settlement was the product of
duress exerted by her attorney. 115 The court affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment on the basis that a contract cannot be rendered unenforce-
able unless the duress emanates from a third-party who is involved with the
other party to the contract. 116 Because the auto owner's attorney had no in-
volvement with the repair shop, the duress doctrine could not apply.
117
IV. THE DURESS DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS
A. Ultimate Result
Commentators over the years have noted that the courts make an abso-
lute mess of applying the duress doctrine. 118 While it is certainly true, and has
been true for decades, that the courts' treatment of duress is unpredictable and
sometimes nonsensical, there are lessons to be learned from a deeper look at
duress as it exists in the courts today.
In published state cases from 1996 through 2003, duress was discussed
in eighty-eight cases. In many of these cases, the party claiming duress was
appealing a grant of a motion to dismiss or a grant of summary judgment on the
duress claim. Thus, the appellate court was, in many cases, simply deciding
whether the lower court decided the matter prematurely and should consider the
duress claim more fully. 119 In only nine of the eighty-eight cases did the court
decide the matter in favor of the duress claim.' 2 0 In only two cases did the court
113 929 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App. 1996). But see Mason v. Ariz. Educ. Loan Mktg. Assistance
Corp. (In re Mason), 300 BR. 160, 167 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (discussing approvingly the idea
of duress being based on a threat by a third party).
114 Kosawska, 929 S.W.2d at 506.
115 Id. at 507.
116 Id. at 508.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 2, at 288 ("the conflict and confusion in results of decided
cases seems greater that ever before"); Note, supra note 3, at 892 ("The limits of the doctrine,
however, are not clear, and the courts have not used consistent standards for a finding of duress.").
119 See, e.g., ABB Kraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft v. Brownsville Barge & Crane, Inc., 115
S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. App. 2003) (review of grant of summary judgment); Rochelle Assocs. v.
Fleet Bank, 645 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (review of grant of summary judgment);
Slone v. Purina Mills, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (review of grant of summary
judgment).
120 See Inter-Tel, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 985 P.2d 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Krantz v. BT Visual
Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4 th 164, (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Court,
954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); Bath v. Hi-Tech Int'l, Inc., 704 So. 2d 292 (La. Ct. App.
1997); Young v. Anne Arundel County, 807 A.2d 651 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); In re Estate of
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affirm a lower court's finding of duress. 12 1 In one case the court reversed and
remanded but clearly held that the prenuptial agreement at issue was the product
of duress. 122 In the other six cases, the appellate court remanded for further
proceedings on the duress issue. 
123
Only two federal appellate cases have resulted in findings in favor of
duress since the beginning of 1995.124 One might expect more findings in favor
of duress in the opinions of the federal district courts since those courts are trial
courts. Yet, in the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, only three published opin-
ions from the district courts or bankruptcy courts have been in favor of du-
ress. 125 In one bankruptcy case the court held a debt consolidation agreement
was the product of duress. 126 The other two courts held that the duress claim in
each case should not have been summarily dismissed.
127
Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003); Blumenthal v. Tener, 642 N.Y.S.2d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996);
Radford v. Keith, 584 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 591 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2004) (per
curiam); In re Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
121 See Bath, 704 So. 2d 292 ; Radford, 584 S.E.2d 815.
122 See In re Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (the court stated that prenuptial agreements deserved
heightened scrutiny).
123 See Inter-Tel, 985 P.2d 596; Krantz, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164; Vail/Arrowhead, 954 P.2d 608;
Young v., 807 A.2d 651; Blumenthal, 642 N.Y.S.2d 26; In re Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021
(Utah Ct. App. 2003).
124 See Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Contempo De-
sign, Inc. v. Chicago & N.E. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d 535, 535 (7th Cir. 2000).
Other cases in which duress was raised as an issue but rejected include: Rochester Ford Sales, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2002); VKK Corp. v. Nat'l Football League, 244
F.3d 114, 121-25 (2d Cir. 2001); Prof 1 Serv. Network, Inc. v. Am. Alliance Holding Co., 238
F.3d 897, 900-02 (7th Cir. 2001); Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 385-87 (7th Cir. 2000);
Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1999); Gibson v. Wal-Mart
Stores Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999); Strickland Tower Maint., Inc. v. AT & T
Communications, Inc., 128 F.3d 1422, 1425-26 (10th Cir. 1997); Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472,
477-78 (5th Cir. 1996); McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 89,
92 (5th Cir. 1995).
125 See Mason v. Ariz. Educ. Loan Mktg. Assistance Corp. (in re Mason), 300 B.R. 160, 167-
169 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Prods., 90 F. Supp. 2d 861,
875 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
126 See Mason, 300 B.R. at 167.
127 See Gen. Motors, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 875; King v. Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739
(W.D. Va. 2000). Other cases in which the district courts have discussed the duress doctrine
include: Benincasa v. Flight Sys. Auto. Group, L.L.C., 242 F. Supp. 2d 529, 538 (N.D. Ohio
2002); Gonzalez v. Fla. Dept. of Highway Safety, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002);
Outek Caribbean Distribs., Inc. v. Echo, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 263, 263 (D. P.R. 2002); Leonard v.
Univ. of Del., 204 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787-88 (D. Del. 2002); U.S. v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F.
Supp. 2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857,
861-65 (W.D. Va. 2001); DeLuca v. Bear Steams & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106-14 (D. Mass.
2001); Pellerin Const., Inc. v. Witco Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575-80 (E.D. La. 2001); Mathias
v. Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v.
[Vol. 107
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/6
CONTRA CT DURESS DOCTRINE
B. Possible Explanations
One must ask why duress, though raised by parties, has such a low rate
of success in the courts. Three explanations are possible. First, perhaps the
party raising the issue of duress does not have the case for it. Perhaps the party
seeking to avoid a contract is looking for any port in the storm and so claims
• • • 128
duress when the facts really do not support the application of the doctrine. Or
perhaps the party cannot determine whether the doctrine applies or not because
there is no clear statement of the doctrine upon which to rely.
A second explanation of the miserly approach courts have taken regard-
ing the duress doctrine may be that courts have no clear idea what duress is or
should be and so decline to find it. The courts may be erring on the side of cau-
tion because they face a wasteland of guidance. 
129
A third possible explanation for why claims of duress have not suc-
ceeded is that courts have a general wariness of any doctrine that requires a
court not to enforce an apparently otherwise enforceable contract. This reti-
cence to set aside contracts is clearly a manifestation of the courts' inherent be-
lief in the value of the freedom of contract. The courts do not want to set aside a
contract on any basis because of a belief that to do so inflicts an injury on the
ideal of freedom of contract.
One basis for the high esteem the notion of freedom of contract enjoys
is that protecting the freedom of contract protects the broader and more amor-
phous concept of freedom by allowing autonomy of choice. Any limitation of
freedom regarding contracting is a limitation of this broader notion of free-
dom.
130
Another basis for the policy in favor of freedom of contract is that free-
dom of contract is as an essential premise to society's ordering of private obliga-
tions, perhaps regardless of any inherent value freedom of contract might
Merck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Scandiavian Satellite Sys., AS v.
Prime TV Ltd., 146 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8-19 (D.D.C. 2001); Milgrim v. Backroads, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
2d 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hudson v. Ind. Limestone Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034-39
(S.D. Ind. 2001); Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741-49 (D.S.C. 2001); Morris
v. N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys., 129 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); G.E.B., Inc. v.
QVC, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 856, 861 (M.D.N.C. 2000); Amoco Oil Co. v. Gomez, 125 F. Supp.
2d 492, 500-06 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Legal Aid Soc'y v. City of N.Y., 114 F. Supp. 2d 204, 224-26
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057-62 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
128 See, e.g, Tarpy v. County of San Diego, 110 Cal. App. 4th 267, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(dog owner claimed that he agreed to consent to the spaying of his dog under duress); Crase v.
Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471,474 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (the purchaser of a house claimed duress though
the seller had offered to call off the deal); Boud v. SDNCO, Inc, 54 P.3d 1131, 1137 (Utah 2002)
(a buyer of a yacht claimed that he signed the sales contract under duress).
129 See discussion in sections IV.C. & V. supra.
130 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the 'Rise and Fall,' 79 B.U.L.
REV. 263, 282-89 (1999) (discussing the relationship of freedom and freedom of contract. See
also Stewart, supra note 3 (discussing freedom and freedom of contract).
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have. 131 The freedom of contract concept means that individuals have the right
to choose obligations freely and that the law will honor those choices not simply
to honor freedom notions for inherent value but because the honoring of such
obligations promotes optimal market and societal behavior in terms of efficiency
and fairness. A long held assumption about market behavior is that optimal re-
sults on the whole obtain when each individual actor in the market chooses the
best option for that individual.132 'A very strong presumption of enforceability
of contracts that represent the freely bargained agreement of the parties' exists
reflecting 'the principle that it is in the best interest of the public not to unneces-
sarily restrict peoples' freedom of contract."'' 133 Thus, the policy in favor of
freedom of contract counsels minimizing the interference of government, via
regulation or judicial action, with private contracting. A result of the influence
of the policy in favor of freedom of contracting would be a standard for finding
duress that ensures that contracts are set aside on the basis of duress only when
one party's choice to enter into the bargain is substantially and improperly fet-
tered. Another result of the influence of the policy in favor of freedom of con-
tract may be a reticence of individual judges to find duress on the particular
facts of the case before them even when the court also applies a duress test that
gives appropriate deference to the freedom of contract. 13
Yet, if assent to a bargain is not the product of unfettered choice- if
parties to a contract do not have the unfettered freedom to choose which bar-
gains are best for them and which are not-the freedom of contract of the indi-
131 See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harvard
University Press 1993) (discussing various theories of freedom of contract); Pettit, supra note
130, at 282 (discussion market theories); K.M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An
Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMvP. L. 95, 109-110
(1999) (discussing the market role of freedom of contract); Stewart, supra note 3, at 229 (discuss-
ing the freedom of contract with regard to private ordering). See also Dalzell, supra note 9, at 237
("We have been proud of our 'freedom of contract,' confident that the maximum of social progress
will result from encouragement of each man's initiative and ambition by giving him the right to
use his economic powers to the full.").
132 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 49 (Little, Brown 1977) (espousing
this thesis). See also Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 278-
79 (1986); Hale, Bargaining, supra note 10 (discussing the concept of individual bargaining as the
basis for the economic system).
133 Roberts' Hair Designers, Inc. v. Pearson, 780 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Eck & Assocs. v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998)).
134 See Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365, 366 (1921) ("Adam
Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill successively insisted on freedom of bargaining as
the fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress; and imposed their theories on the edu-
cated thought of their times with a thoroughness not common in economic speculation."). See
also Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159, (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) ("reluctan[ce] to set aside agreements because of the notion of freedom of contract and...
the desirability of having private dispute resolutions be final").
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vidual is less.135 Indeed, the individual's freedom as a measurable commodity is
less. 136 To the extent that the notion of freedom encompasses some idea of
autonomy to enter into binding arrangements, then "to enforce agreements made
by fraud or coercion would nullify the point of allowing binding agreements in
the first place." 137 Also, assumptions about market behavior may fail. Society
cannot assume that the market process works to achieve optimal results and effi-
ciencies if the basic assumption that parties to a bargain choose the best option
for themselves does not apply. When a bargainer makes a choice but is con-
strained by duress, those assumptions may not be valid. The systemic result that
individual self-maximizing decisions yield optimal market conditions may not
obtain. 138
There has been much discussion over the years about whether courts are
valuing the freedom of contract or whether the policy is in disfavor. 139 In recent
years some commentators have suggested that the freedom of contract is recog-
nized as a strong doctrine.140 Earlier accounts had called the continued viability
of the doctrine into question. 14 1 There is no doubt that legislation has taken
certain subjects out of the general contract discourse and regulated those areas
specially. For example, many states have statutes regulating much regarding
surrogate parent contracts. 142 In this way, some freedom regarding contracting
has, no doubt, been reduced. Within the realm of judicially administered gen-
eral contract doctrine, the treatment of the duress doctrine exemplifies the
strength of the notion of freedom of contract within the realm of judicial deci-
sion- making. In addition, the political climate of the early years of the twenty-
first century is not one that would encourage judicial holdings that could be
viewed as contrary to freedom of contract and therefore contrary to freedom in
general. 143 The rhetorical force of a plea for freedom of contract is tremen-
135 See Hale, Bargaining, supra note 10, at 627-28.
136 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 20 ("If respect for liberty requires that one be permitted
to make binding agreements, it also demands that binding agreements reflect one's voluntary
choices."); Pettit, supra note 130, at 282-87 (arguing that an increase of freedom of contract is not
necessarily an increase of freedom in all cases).
137 WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 21.
138 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 48-49. See also POSNER, supra note 132, at 49.
139 See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Clarendon Press
1979) ; F.H. BUCKLEY, ED., THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Duke University
Press 1999); GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ohio State University Press 1974).
140 See, e.g. BUCKLEY, supra note 139.
141 See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 139; GILMORE, supra note 139; TREBILCOCK, supra note 131.
142 See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 81.6 (2003).
143 The first years of the century, marked by the 9/11 disaster and the response of the United
States militarily and in the form of anti-terror legislation and sentiment, has been one in which
patriotism and talk of "freedom" has been high.
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dous.144 Indeed, in commenting in the 1930s on the force of the idea of freedom
of contract, Professor Morris Cohen noted, "pleas that under present conditions
we need certain limitations on the freedom of contract have encountered the
objection that we must not go against history and thereby revert to barba-
rism." 145 Yet, as others have noted, individual liberty and the aggregate free-
dom of contract will be lessened absent some limits on freedom of contract just
as the efficiency of traveling on the roadways would be less absent traffic
laws. 146 In other words, though the duress doctrine results in holding some con-
tracts unenforceable, the result is a maximization of freedom of contract by only
enforcing contracts freely made.
The definition of the doctrine itself reflects the power of the notion of
freedom of contract. Courts have defined duress narrowly so that a finding of
duress is rare indeed. In addition, the law of many states gives even more sub-
stance to the reticence to set aside any contract by requiring that the party claim-
ing duress prove the case by clear and convincing evidence. 147 But even when
refusing to enforce a contract is possible given the jurisdiction's definition of
duress, the courts may refuse to do so.14 8 As one court has stated, "Duress is not
readily accepted as an excuse." 149 With regard to economic duress in particular,
I" See Pettit, supra note 130, at 280.
145 Cohen, supra note 13, at 554.
146 See id. at 587 ("Regulations, therefore, involving some restrictions on the freedom of con-
tract are as necessary to real liberty as traffic restrictions are necessary to assure real freedom in
the general use of our highways.").
147 See, e.g., Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288, 1288-90 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); W.T. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 846 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Gibson-Terry &
Terry, 758 N.E.2d 459, 468 (111. App. Ct. 2001); Reliable Furniture Co. v. Am. Home Assurance
Co., 466 P.2d 368, 370 (Utah 1970); Pelfrey v. Pelfrey, 487 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Unknown Father, 345 S.E.2d 533, 541 (1986) (quoting 63
MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Duress and Undue Influence §§ 2-3 (Repl. Vol. 1985))) (""[D]uress is
not readily accepted as an excuse,' and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."). See
also Mason v. Ariz. Educ. Loan Mktg.Assistance Corp. (In re Mason), 300 B.R. 160, 165 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2003); Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall Co., 572 S.E.2d 900, 905 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting
Warner v. Warner, 394 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1990)) (when the contract is a settlement, "'this Court
will not set aside such agreements on allegations of duress ... absent clear and convincing proof of
such claims"').
148 See Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545, 547
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no duress, the court stated, "Georgia courts are reluctant to void
contracts, and we have found no Georgia decision voiding a contract on the theory of economic
duress.").
149 Seward v. Am. Hardware, 171 S.E. 650, 662 (Va. 1933), quoted in Todd v. Blue Ridge
Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (W.D. Va. 2001). See also Nasik Breeding & Re-
search Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc. v. Bell Realty, Inc., 1995 WL 50591, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. August 23, 1995) (quoting
Int'l Halliwell Mines v. Cont'l Copper & Steel Indus., 544 F. 2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1976))) ("A
party seeking to avoid a contract because of economic duress shoulders a heavy burden.").
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one court has stated: "The doctrine applies only to special, unusual, or extraor-
dinary situations."'' 150 This reticence is an additional and unfortunate effect of
the influence of the policy of freedom of contract because the result may be the
enforcement of bargains that are not the product of substantially unfettered deci-
sion-making. Such enforcement actually may reduce freedom of contract and is
certainly contrary to the underlying justification for the policy in favor of free-
dom of contract.
C. The Use of the Free Will Concept
The test for duress that has been used by many courts is one that focuses
on the free will of the bargainer. 151 This test is consistent with the fact that his-
torically contractual liability has been based on the notion of freely willed assent
of the parties. 152 For example, in Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc.,153 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court stated that duress exists "when a defendant commits a
wrongfiul act sufficient to prevent a plaintiff from exercising his free will,
thereby coercing the plaintiffs consent."1 54 Another phrasing is that the threat
150 Shufford v. Integon Indem. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1299 (M.D. Ala 1999) (quoting
Ralls v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 422 So. 2d 764, 766 (Ala. 1982)).
151 See generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2, at 316 (5th
Ed. 2003) ("[t]he general rule is that any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a
party constitutes duress").
152 See Roscoe Pound, The Role of Will in Law, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1954) ; Elizabeth
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 758-59 (1981) (voluntary
exchange is a basic tenet of classical contract theory); WILLISTON, supra note 134, at 367-72.
153 436 S.E.2d 450 (Va. 1993).
154 Id. at 452. This test was quoted and applied in Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175
F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (W.D. Va. 2001). See also Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated
Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 1990) ("the lack of free will"); Vanguard Packaging,
Inc. v. Midland Bank, 871 F. Supp. 348, 352 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (quoting Andes v. Albano, 853
S.W.2d 936, 942 (Mo. 1993) (quoting McCandlish v. Linker, 231 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. 1950)))
("[t]he central question with respect to duress is whether, considering all the surrounding circum-
stances, one party to the transaction was 'prevented from exercising his free will by the threats or
wrongful conduct of the other"'); Zebedeo v. Martin E. Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394, 1417 (D.
Conn. 1984) (citing Galusha v. Sherman, 81 N.W. 495 (Wisc. 1900)) ("The wrongful conduct at
issue could take virtually any form, but must induce a fearful state of mind in the other party,
which makes it 'impossible for [the party] to exercise his own free will."'); Moss v. Davis, 794
A.2d 1288, 1290 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2001) (The act "overcomes the will of a person."); Krilich v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153, 1162 (Il1. App. Ct. 2002) (quoting Hurd v. Wildman,
Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 609 (111. App. Ct. 1999)) ("Duress occurs where one is in-
duced by a wrongful act or threat of another to make a contract under circumstances that deprive
one of the exercise of one's own free will." Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 303 111.
App.3d 84, 91 236 Ill. Dec. 482, 707 N.E.2d 609 (1999) To establish duress, one must demon-
strate that the threat has left the individual "'bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making
of a contract."' Hurd, 303 Ill.App.3d at 91, 236 Il.Dec. 482, 707 N.E.2d 609 (quoting Alexander
v. Standard Oil Co., 97 llI.App.3d 809, 815, 53 IlI.Dec. 194, 423 N.E.2d 578 (1981)).; Putz v.
Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 480
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has left the individual "bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a
contract."5 5 This formulation suggests even more strongly a capacity test as
opposed to a choice constraint test. Another related formulation is one requiring
"involuntary acceptance of contract terms."156 Whatever the formulation of this
N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)) ("The ultimate fact to be determined is whether the pur-
ported victim was deprived of the free exercise of his will."); Young v. Anne Arundel County, 807
A.2d 651, 692 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) ("To establish duress there must be a wrongful act
which strips the individual of the ability to utilize his free will."); In re Estate of Davis, 832 So. 2d
534, 538 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Duckworth v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 150 So. 2d 163
(Miss. 1963))("[I]t must ultimately determine whether the specific conduct by the dominant party
dispossessed the complaining party of all volition."); Hughes v. Pullman, 36 P.3d 339, 343 (Mont.
2001) (citing Hoover v. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings, 707 P.2d 915, 919 (Mont. 1990)) (The act
'overcomes the will of a person."); Lyons v, Lyons, 734 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736-37 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (quoting Mahony v. Moorman, 650 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)) ("To maintain a
claim of duress, plaintiff must demonstrate that threats allegedly made by defendant 'deprived
[her] of the ability to act in furtherance of [her] own interests' or deprived her of the ability to
exercise her own free will.") ; Radford v. Keith, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), affd,
591 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2004) (quoting Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (N.C. 1910)) ('Du-
ress exists where one, by unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or
forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will."'); HRN, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co, 102 S.W.3d 205, 215-16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) rev'don other grounds HRN, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 2004 WL 190835 (Tex. August 27, 2004) (citing Chapman's Children Trust v.
Porter & Hedges LLP, 32 S.W.3d 429, 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)) ("There can be no duress with-
out the following: ... (2) the action or threat was of such a character as to destroy the other party's
free agency; (3) the threat or action overcame the opposing party's free will and caused it to do
that which it would not otherwise have done and that which it was not legally bound to do; .... ");
Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re TR, 777 P.2d. 1106, 1111
(Wyo. 1989)) ('[D]uress exists whenever a person is induced, by the unlawful act of another, to
perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will."').
155 Alexander, 423 N.E.2d at 582 (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (111. 1962).
See also Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 (D.S.C. 2001) (citing In re Nightin-
gale Estate, 189 S.E. 890, 897 (S.C. 1937); Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 4
S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1939)) ("[u]nder South Carolina law, duress has been defined as coercion that
puts a person in such fear that he is 'bereft' of the quality of mind essential to the making of a
contract and the contract was thereby obtained as a result of this state of mind").
156 Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1989)). See also Rumsfeld v.
Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("involuntary accepted the terms of
another"); Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. La Soul, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D. Vt. 1997)
(citing Kokoletsos v. Frank Babcock & Son, Inc., 538 A.2d 178 (1987)) ("one side must have
involuntarily accepted the terms of another"); N. Fabrication Co. v. UNOCAL, 980 P.2d 958, 960
(Alaska 1999) (citing Zelinger v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 823 P.2d 635, 657 (Alaska
1992)) ("one party involuntarily accepted the terms of another"); In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795,
797 (N.H. 2002) (quoting Goodwin R.R. v. State, 517 A.2d 823, 830 (N.H. 1986)) ("To establish
duress, a party must show that it involuntarily accepted the other party's terms .... "); Dunes
Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001) ("one side
involuntarily accepted the terms of another").
There are other formulations. See, e.g., W.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d 1278,
1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Herald v. Hardin, 116 So. 863, 864 (Fla. 1928)) ("A condi-
tion of mind produced by an improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the
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free will test, courts generally apply the test in a subjective manner so that the
court is only concerned about the free will of the bargainer, not the free will of
the reasonable bargainer.' 5 7  Occasionally, a court has used an objective free
will test.
1 58
Any test focusing on free will is problematic because the paradigmatic
duress situation is, in fact, a situation in which the bargainer exercises free will.
That will is simply limited significantly by the choices available. Society may
not like the constrained nature of the choices facing a bargainer in a duress
situation, but the bargainer chooses nonetheless between those choices. One
cannot say that limiting the choices available to a bargainer completely robs the
bargainer of his or her free will. There are degrees of freedom and degrees of
free will. The free will concept does not account for gradations.1
59
Also, one must recognize that all choice is constrained in some ways.160
All of us make decisions in the context of the circumstances in which we find
ourselves. Professor Dalzell gives the example of a bargainer agreeing to pay
ten cents to a baker for a loaf of bread.161 The bargainer's free will is restrained
because the bargainer must choose between the two options given to him: to
give ten cents or to go without bread. The duress doctrine has never been used
to eliminate all constraints on free decision-making and thus does not perfect
free will in situations such as the bread contract. 162 As many commentators and
philosophers have noted, the type of situation courts have used duress to regu-
late is a situation in which the bargainer is exercising his or her own will in a
rational manner just as the bread bargainer does. When a party signs an agree-
free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or make a contract not of his own volition.");
Cherry, 4 S.E.2d at 123. (Duress is a "condition of the mind produced by improper external pres-
sure of influence that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or
form a contract not of his own volition.").
i57 See, e.g., Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d at 709. See also Todd, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (discussing the
objective and subjective approaches); Mason v. Ariz. Educ. Loan Mktg. Assistance Corp. (In re
Mason), 300 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (applying a subjective analysis even when the
party claiming duress is particularly gullible). See generally PERILLO, supra note 151, at 316;
Note, supra note 3, at 893-94.
158 See, e.g., Smith v. Lenchner, 205 A.2d 626, 628 (1964). See also WERTHEIMER, supra note
5, at 34. For a historical discussion of objective tests, see Dawson, supra note 2. Regarding an
objective analysis, Dawson states: "That it directly influenced decision at any time is unlikely and
for present purposes it can be henceforth ignored." Id. at 238.
159 See WERTEEIMER, supra note 5, at 29; Dalzell, supra note 9, at 238.
160 See WERTHEIMER supra note 5, at 10; Rick Bigwood, Coercion in Contract: The Theoreti-
cal Constructs ofDuress, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 201, 201-02 (1996).
161 See Dalzell, supra note 9, at 239.
162 See Hale, Bargaining, supra note 10, at 612 ("all money is paid, and all contracts are made,
to avert some kinds of threats"); Hale, Coercion, supra note 10.
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ment at gunpoint, that party is responding to two alternatives and making a ra-
tional choice between the two. In both situations the parties consent.
163
Because the free will concept truly does not fit the reality of the duress
paradigm, courts are at a loss as to how to determine when the bargainer has
been robbed of free will and when the bargainer has retained his or her free will.
In other words, since the test does not fit the situation, applying the test is im-
possible. 164 As long as the bargainer chooses between options by means of ra-
tional thought, the bargainer exercises free will. Thus, duress in the constrained
choice scenario can never exist. Since the burden is on the party claiming du-
ress to prove lack of free will, or lack of voluntariness, courts usually conclude
that the party has failed to make the proof.
165
Even if the free will concept fits the paradigm of the duress situation,
any test asking a court to determine whether a party has been deprived of free
will, without further guidance, is too vague to be of use to courts. A good ex-
ample of the confusion is evidenced by the following intriguing statement in
Vanguard Packaging, Inc. v. Midland Bank:166 "Furthermore, in order to estab-
lish a claim of economic duress, plaintiff must show that the wrongful act,
which overcame his free will, caused him to do something he would not have
otherwise done."' 167 Though it is perhaps possible, it is difficult to grasp a situa-
tion in which a party could satisfy the burden of proof with regard to the ab-
sence of free will and yet not be able to prove that the party, as a result, did
something he or she would not otherwise have done.
Also, tests using the verbiage of "free will," "involuntary acceptance,"
and "bereft of the quality of mind" improperly lead courts to considerations of. • 168
capacity rather than considerations of choice constraints. Thus, once again,
the party claiming duress cannot succeed in proving the case because there is
usually, especially in business settings, no impairment of decision-making ca-
163 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 9, 33-35. See also Cohen, supra note 13, at 569 (There
is freedom to choose but the choice'is constrained to the point of not being free.); Fingarette,
supra note 12, at 74 (distinguishing constrained choice from "sheer mindless panic"). See gener-
ally ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 198-202; Philips, supra note 12.
164 Note, supra note 3, at 924 (noting that the use of a free will test has added confusion to the
duress doctrine).
165 See, e.g., Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857, 854-65 (W.D. Va.
2001); N. Fabrication Co. v. UNOCAL, 980 P.2d 958, 961-62 (Alaska 1999); Dunes Hospitality,
L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484, 492-93 (S.D. 2001). See also supra section
IV.A. (discussing the scarcity of court decisions in favor of a finding of duress).
166 871 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
167 Id. at 352 (citing Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986).
168 See Kostritsky, supra note 3, at 599-600 (the language implies a psychological test); Finga-
rette, supra note 12, at 72 (whether a "psychic capacity has been seriously disabled").
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pacity. So, for example, in Hyman v. Ford Motor Co.,169 the court applied a test
that the claimer of duress must be "'bereft' of the quality of mind essential to the
making of a contract." 170 The business could not satisfy this test in a situation
involving the signing of a release as part of an agreement whereby Ford repur-
chased a car dealership. 17 1 The court noted that the business consulted with
counsel and that rarely will duress exist 'when the parties are sophisticated and
represented by counsel during negotiations."" 72 Yet, while the presence of an
attorney may affect undue influence and decision-making capacity, it does not
affect the situation of constrained choice. If the business has the choice of bank-
ruptcy or signing a contract, the fact that the bargainer has the resource of an
attorney to explain the alternative does not change the array of alternatives.
173
A free will test is particularly useless, and particularly ridiculous, when
the free will in question is that of an entity such as a corporation. How is a court
to make a determination of whether the corporation has been deprived of free
will? In General Motors Corp. v. Paramount Metal Products Co., 14 Paramount
contracted to supply all of General Motors' seat frame requirements on a "just in
time" basis. 7 5 Paramount later threatened to stop supplying the seat frame if
General Motors did not agree to an increased price for the products. 176 General
Motors agreed to the increased price but then obtained a substitute supplier and
claimed duress with regard to the price increase. 177 The court concluded that it
was possible for General Motors to prove that Paramount's actions had deprived
it of "the exercise of [its] ... free will."' 178
169 142 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D.S.C. 2001).
170 Id. at 744 (citing In re Nightingale Estate, 189 S.E. 890, 897 (S.C. 1937); Cherry v. Shelby
Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 4 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1939)).
171 Id. at 745.
172 Id. at 746 (quoting Humana Kansas City, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 1995 WL 669241 (W.D.
Mo. Nov. 8, 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1996)(table)).
173 See Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10 t Cir.
1990) (agreeing that the presence of an attorney does not negate a finding of duress).
174 90 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
175 Id. at 864.
176 Id.
177 Idat 865.
7 Id. at 875. See also Applied, 912 F.2d at 1242; Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d
744, 745 (D.S.C. 2001); Vanguard Packaging, Inc. v. Midland Bank, 871 F. Supp. 348, 352-55
(W.D. Mo. 1994); Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d
545, 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (the court concluded that one corporation "was deprived of its free
will by" the other corporation).
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Commentators long have recognized the impossibility of applying the
free will concept to duress. 179 Indeed, though the Restatement (First) spoke in
terms of free will, 180 the Restatement (Second) abandoned the concept in favor
of an analysis of whether the bargainer had a reasonable alternative to the bar-
gain now the subject of complaint. 18 1 The comment to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) referred to the free will concept as difficult due to "vagueness and imprac-
ticability." '182 The comment continued, "It is enough if the threat actually in-
duces assent.., on the part of one who has no reasonable alternative."'
183
Yet, courts of today continue to quote a test for duress involving free
will, sometimes along with a test of no reasonable alternative. 184 For example,
in Hyman v, Ford Motor Co., 185 the court quoted a test requiring the bargain to,,, ,.... ,,186
be .. bereft' of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract, but
then tossed the following into the mix: "[E]ven considering all favorable infer-
ences from the alleged facts in Hyman's favor, he still cannot establish he had no
reasonable alternative but to sign the release."' 187 The court never explained
how the reasonable alternative related to the quality of mind test. Another ex-
179 See ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 201 (the "'overborne will' theory should now be consigned to
the historical scrapheap").
180 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
181 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
182 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1981).
183 Id. See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 29 ("The rejection of the will theory, at least as
a complete account of contractual duress, is now enshrined in virtually all the standard tests and in
the major treatise which attempts to summarize and explain the accepted doctrines of contract
law.").
184 See, e.g., Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480, 498 (D. Del. 1999), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Custom
Blending Int'l Inc., 1998 WL 842289 at *4 (Del. Ch. Ct. November 24, 1998)) ("a release may be
void for duress where a party's manifestation of assent is induced by (1) an improper threat, (2)
which overcomes the party's free will and (3) leaves the party with no reasonable alternative to
protect his interest"); Leonard v. Univ. of Del., 204 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (D. Del. 2002) (citing
Dupont, 1998 WL 842289 at *4)) ("To prove duress, Leonard must demonstrate: (1) an impropei
threat, (2) which overcame his free will, and (3) left him with no reasonable alternative to protect
his interest."). See also Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (W.D.
Va. 2001) (quoting King v. Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000)). The
court stated: "[T]he court shall assume that the defendants' acts were wrongful. Furthermore, the
court shall accept the Plaintiffs statement that her will was overcome." Todd, 175 F. Supp. 2d at
864. Yet, the court later noted that the coercive threat must leave the plaintiff "without any rea-
sonable alternative." Id.
185 142 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D.S.C. 2001).
186 Id. at 744.
187 Id. at 745.
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ample of this confusion is Luttohan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 188 in
which the court stated the following: "The elements of economic duress are '1) a
wrongful act or improper threat; 2) the absence of a reasonable alternative to
entering the agreement; and 3) the lack of free will."'"189
Far too much time has passed since the publication of the Restatement
(Second) and too many decisions have been rendered to conclude that courts
have not had the opportunity to consider the Restatement (Second). The courts
seem to ignore the Restatement (Second) and all of the literature dealing with
the faults of a free will test. Why? There may not be an answer other than that
courts have engaged, perhaps, in blind regurgitation of precedent within each
.. 190
jurisdiction. Then again, perhaps other parts of the duress portion of the Re-
statement (Second) are so offensive to courts that they reject the Restatement
(Second) entirely with regard to duress and are left with no other ready test or
definition. For example, the portion of the Restatement (Second) that calls for
analysis of the substance of the deal may, in effect, repel courts entirely. 19 1 Of
course, it is entirely possible that the courts have carefully considered the matter
and choose to retain the free will concept.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. The Alternatives Analysis
The duress doctrine will not be usable until courts move away from the
flawed free will notion. However, the entire duress analysis should not be re-
188 927 F. Supp. 403 (D. Kan. 1996).
189 Id. at 411 (quoting Comeau v. Mount Carmel Med. Ctr., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 858, 865 (D.
Kan. 1994)). See also Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238,
1242 (10t' Cir. 1990) ("In general the elements of economic duress are: (1) a wrongful act or
improper threat; (2) the absence of a reasonable alternative to entering the agreement; and (3) the
lack of free will."); Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480, 498 (D. Del. 1999), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir. 2001) ("a release may be void for duress where a
party's manifestation of assent is induced by (1) an improper threat, (2) which overcomes the
party's free will and (3) leaves the party with no reasonable alternative to protect his interest");
Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288, 1290 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (duress elements are "(1) a wrongful
act; which (2) overcomes the will of a person; who (3) has no adequate legal remedy to protect
their interest"); Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484, 490
(S.D. 2001) (requiring involuntary acceptance and "circumstances permit[ting] no other reason-
able alternative"); Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Blubaugh v.
Turner, 842 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Wyo. 1992))("'(1) a party involuntarily accepts the terms of
another, (2) circumstances permit no other alternative"').
190 See, e.g., Radford v. Keith, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), afd, 591 S.E.2d 519
(N.C. 2004) (quoting Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (N.C. 1910)), "'Duress exists where
one, by unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under
circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will."'
191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
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stricted to an analysis of the nature of the threat. The effect of the threat on the
party's choice is relevant. The test of choice constraint should focus on the ex-
treme nature of the constraint and identify situations of extreme constraint for
application of the duress doctrine. The "no reasonable alternatives" test of the
Restatement (Second) does this rather well. 1
92
Some courts.have used a "no alternatives" analysis along with a volun-
tariness or free will analysis. For example, in Nasik Breeding & Research
Farm, Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 193 the court stated a test requiring "involuntary ac-
ceptance of contract terms" and "no other alternative to accepting the imposed
terms." 194 Nasik claimed that it had entered into the settlement of claims "be-
cause it was on the verge of bankruptcy, and did not have the time and resources
,,. 195
to litigate against several multinational conglomerates. Having stated the
rule regarding an alternative in absolute terms, the court concluded that Nasik
"had the option of turning down the settlement and pursuing a legal claim."'
96
Litigation is almost always an alternative to agreeing to an unfortunate
set of terms. Yet, litigation is occasionally not a realistic alternative. 197 In the
Nasik situation, if bankruptcy was indeed imminent absent the bargain, it seems
a bit of a fairy tale to say that the complaining party could refuse the bargain,
file bankruptcy, engage in lengthy litigation, and bounce back into the market
anew. Thus, the Nasik court's use of a "no alternative" test is problematic.
In Krilich v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 198a party, Bongi
Development Corporation, failed to pay on a note for the purchase of a piece of
property and claimed that it partly agreed to the deal only because the other
party threatened to breach a second contract. 199 In particular, the party threat-
192 See id. at § 175. See also Dalzell, supra note 9, at 240 (suggesting such a standard).
193 165 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
194 Id. at 527.
195 Id. See also Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("the
circumstances permitted no other alternative"); N. Fabrication Co. v. UNOCAL, 980 P.2d 958,
960 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Zeilinger v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 823 P.2d 653, 657
(Alaska 1992) (quoting Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d
15, 21 (Alaska 1978))) ("Duress is said to exist where '(1) one party involuntarily accepted the
terms of another, (2) circumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) such circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the other party."'); Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 52
P.3d 307, 312 (Idaho 2002) ("no other alternative"); In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 797 (N.H.
2002) (quoting Goodwin R.R. v. State, 517 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986)) ('the party had no alternative
but to accept the terms set out by the other party"').
196 Id.
197 See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analy-
sis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 362-63
(1993) (stating that legal remedies for breach are "systemically undercompensatory").
198 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
199 Id. at 1159.
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ened to breach the other contract by failing to improve the property that was the
200
subject of the contract.. The breach of this second contract would cause
Bongi great losses from construction delays. 20 1  Bongi claimed the breach
would cause financial collapse and bankruptcy. 202 Any litigation regarding this
second contract, Bongi claimed, would result in protracted litigation.203 Apply-
ing a free will test of duress, the lower court granted a motion to dismiss and the
appellate court affirmed, in part on the basis that Bongi had an adequate judicial
remedy for any breach of contract by the other party. 204 The Illinois Court of
Appeal stated: "We acknowledge that Bongi's damages would have been sub-
stantial, but we disagree with Bongi that all of the consequential and incidental
damages of Krilich's threatened breach could not have been recovered through
judicial proceedings." 20 5 It is difficult to fathom a claim of duress that could
survive a motion to dismiss with such a stringent alternatives analysis.
20 6
The Restatement (Second) idea of analyzing whether the bargainer had a
reasonable alternative is a much more usable, though perhaps not perfect, test
for duress. This test asks the court to identify alternatives facing the party
claiming duress and to determine whether any of those alternatives were reason-
able at the time of contracting.207 If the bargainer had reasonable alternatives
and yet chose the bargain now the subject of complaint, one can infer that the
bargain was a product of less restricted choice. If the party had no reasonable
choice but the bargain now the subject of complaint, then it is likely that the
decision to enter the bargain was the product of substantially constrained choice.
No analysis of the lack of free will is necessary. Courts should work success-
fully with this more precise focus.
208
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1163.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1163. The court also supported its holding with the fact that the party claiming duress
"enjoyed access to legal counsel during ... the negotiation period." Id.
206 Other courts have used a "no adequate remedy" test. See, e.g., Moss v, Davis, 794 A.2d
1288, (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) ("no adequate legal remedy"); Hughes v. Pullman, 36 P.3d 339, 343
(Mont. 2001) (the duress claim failed because the claimant had "an adequate legal remedy" in that
he could have refused to agree to an evaluation and treatment and then could have demanded a
hearing if he were suspended). "Adequate" may be the functional equivalent of "reasonable."
207 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1981). See also supra notes 99-100 & ac-
companying text.
208 See, e.g., Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4'h 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Nobel v. White, 783 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 62
P.3d 320, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623
N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 922-23 (Utah 1993); Berardi
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In dealing with such a test, the availability of a legal remedy in the
courts will almost always subvert a finding of duress. If the law provides a rem-
edy apart from a finding of duress, that remedy should be sufficient. The duress
doctrine need not come to the rescue. 209 Yet, as the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated in Kendrick v. Barker,2 10 "[a] person may not have a reasonable alterna-
tive or remedy when the delay in pursuing the remedy would cause immediate
or irreparable serious loss or financial ruin."
211
A legal remedy might be inadequate because of the requisite delay
which accompanies any form of litigation, the kinds of injury for which a court
will award recompense, and the uncertainty of the remedy in general. 212 The
Kendrick court, if faced with the facts of Nasik or Krilich, may have found the
judicial remedies available in those situations to be unreasonable alternatives.
Thus, a finding of duress in each of those cases would be possible using the "no
reasonable alternative" analysis. Yet, even with a "no reasonable alternative"
test, a court's discomfort with setting aside a contract can lead to a stringent
view of reasonableness. Moving to a "no reasonable alternative" test, therefore,
would not assure a duress finding in cases like Nasik and Krilich.
213
B. Duress Should Not Be Confused with Undue Influence
Some courts today seem to blur the line between the duress doctrine and
the doctrine of undue influence. 2 14 Undue influence has been an equity doctrine
v. Meadowbrook Mall Co., 572 S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 2002).
209 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 35 ("If one decides to forego what is an adequate rem-
edy, it is arguable that society has done all that it needs to do."). See also Dalzell, supra note 9, at
240 ("it is better to require the use of such remedies where practicable than to resort to an indis-
criminate overhauling of transactions in court").
210 15 P.3d 734 (Wyo. 2001).
211 Id. at 741 (quoting Blubaugh v. Turner, 842 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Wyo. 1992)).
212 See John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure 11, 20 N.C. L. REV. 341, 370-71 (1942)
(discussing the delay and uncertainty accompanying judicial remedies).
213 See Kostritsky, supra note 3, at 595 n.40 (noting the "no reasonable alternative" test is
easily manipulated). See also Claire Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doc-
trine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1033 (1985); Dalzell, supra note 212, at 378-82.
214 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66, 83-87 (1989). In setting aside a
property settlement in a case in which the wife claimed duress, the court stated: "To show lack of
consent, it was unnecessary to establish that she lacked the capacity to contract, only that she was
in such a mentally weakened condition due to anxiety and emotional anguish or exhaustion that
she was unable to protect herself against Husband's demands." Id. at 85. In a footnote, the court
noted the undue influence connection: "Although the trial court's findings were of duress and
extrinsic fraud or mistake, the record also demonstrates undue influence, that is 'persuasion which
overcomes the will without convincing the judgment."' Id. at 85, n.9 (quoting Odorizzi v. Bloom-
field Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130 (1966)). See also Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001), in which the court noted the problem.
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focusing on the voluntariness of the bargain with special attention given to de-
fects of the contracting party's mental abilities caused in part by the actions of
the other party.2 15 Historically, the duress doctrine has not dealt with the con-
tracting party's mental abilities or capacity. 216 Rather, the two situations dealt
with by the duress doctrine may or may not have involved reduced capacity to
contract. In the first duress scenario the party signs the contract only because
the other party guides the agreeing party's hand on the paper.2 17 The bargain is
unenforceable under duress because it is not voluntarily entered into without
regard to capacity. In the second and more common duress scenario, the party
agrees to the bargain only because the other party has threatened improper ac-
tion as the alternative to assent. 218 The contract is set aside on the basis of du-
ress because of choice constraint, not because of a limiting of decisional capac-
ity. The bargainer's capacity to contract is not at issue. The common traditional
duress paradigm is that the bargainer, with full ability to comprehend and evalu-
ate the situation, including the alternate choices or the absence of such, must
decide to assent or not when a lack of assent may not be a reasonable choice. If
decision-making capacity factors are included in the definition of the duress
The defendants claimed undue influence as a special defense. Although the court failed
to rule on the defendants' undue influence special defense, it did conclude that the install-
ment agreement was obtained under duress and, thus, was void. Although the undue influ-
ence and duress doctrines are separate and distinct, they are often treated and discussed to-
gether. See, e.g., Jenks v. Jenks, 642 A.2d 31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 657 A.2d 1107 (1995). We, therefore, will treat the defendants' special defense of
undue influence as one for duress.
783 A.2d at 1149.
215 See, e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
216 See generally Dawson, supra note 2, at 262. Dawson stated:
Equity doctrines of undue influence had been concerned from the outset with
a different type of inequality of bargaining power. They were never con-
ceived, like common law doctrines of duress, as a corollary of the law of
crime and tort. They were aimed instead at protection for the mentally or
physically inadequate, whose inadequacy fell short of a total lack of legal ca-
pacity.
217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981). The illustration in the Restate-
ment is quite helpful. Illustration one states:
A presents to B, who is physically weaker than A, a written contract prepared
for B's signature and demands that B sign it. B refuses. A grasps B's hand
and compels B by physical force to write his name. B's signature is not effec-
tive as a manifestation of his assent, and there is no contract.
See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 30 (this situation is "nonvolitional duress").
218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). Section 175 states in part: "If a
party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."
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doctrine, many traditional duress situations would no longer constitute duress.
For example, a corporation would probably never be able to successfully claim
duress because a corporation would have a difficult time indeed claiming that
the other party to the contract has reduced its decision-making capacity. Yet,
the corporation's assent may have been the product of a situation of substan-
tially constrained choice. By expanding the duress doctrine to a consideration
of decision-making capacity factors, the application of the duress doctrine is
limited to a smaller set of possible situations. Yet, situations no longer covered
by the doctrine are situations of substantially constrained choice. Such a limit-
ing of the doctrine should be avoided. The duress doctrine should not stray
from the traditional paradigm.
219
The courts have strayed from this tradition both in the definition of du-
ress and also in applying the definition to the facts.220 This straying, however,
appears to be the result of inattention and confusion rather than the result of any
kind of intentional reasoned thought. Use of the free will concept as a part of
the definition of duress provides fertile ground for confusion as to whether
courts should consider capacity to contract factors. The notion of what a lack of
free will might be is so vague as to allow for a variety of interpretations. 22 1 In-
deed, some courts have repeated and applied dated statements of the free will
concept that muddy the water even more than the stark notion of free will might
confuse the issue. 222 In Krilich v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 223 the
219 See Stewart, supra note 3, at 177 (arguing against confusing undue influence with duress).
See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 8-9 (discussing the confusion).
220 See, e.g., DeLuca v. Bear Steams & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D. Mass. 2001) (in
finding no duress, the court noted that the party was given two days to consider and consult with
an attorney); Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545, 546
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("[I]n any event, when the signer of an agreement is sophisticated in business
matters and has access to and in fact obtains advice of counsel, the defense of duress is not avail-
able to void the contract.").
221 See, e.g., Radford v. Keith, 584 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 591 S.E.2d 519
(N.C. 2004). The court used a free will definition of duress and then noted the following in af-
firming a jury verdict of duress:
[A] jury could determine that plaintiff was detained in Keith's office for sev-
eral hours, that plaintiff was emotionally upset by the tone of the meeting, and
that plaintiff did not have counsel present to advise her. Plaintiff stated that at
this time, she was crying and her "mind went crazy thinking[,] 'where am I go-
ing to go"' and that she had done something wrong that would lead to incar-
ceration. At trial, Keith testified that he was angry and upset and asked his as-
sociate to '... go outside and be sure that we're not interrupted' while he and
plaintiff met in his office, The jury could find that Keith's directive that his
associate stand guard at the office door prevented plaintiff from exercising her
will to leave defendants' office. Therefore, a jury could find that defendants'
actions were so severe as to overcome plaintiffs will to leave Keith's office.
Id. at 818-19.
222 See, e.g., Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D.S.C. 2001); Krilich v. Ameri-
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Illinois Court of Appeal stated: "Duress occurs where one is induced by a
wrongful act or threat of another to make a contract under circumstances that
deprive one of the exercise of one's own free will .... To establish duress, one
must demonstrate that the threat has left the individual 'bereft of the quality of
mind essential to the making of a contract."' 224 This formulation, focusing as it
does on the "quality of mind essential" to contracting, invites courts to focus on
mental ability and decision-making capacity to contract factors. Any definition
of the duress doctrine that is so broad is inconsistent with traditional duress.
Courts have also strayed from the traditional duress doctrine in evaluat-
ing the facts of individual cases. Georgia courts have been particularly uniform
in this regard. These courts repeat the mantra that a party cannot avail himself
or herself of the duress doctrine if the party had the benefit of an attorney's ad-
vice.225 The advice of an attorney is certainly relevant in dispelling a claim of
undue influence or any other claim that the party complaining had less than ade-
quate mental ability or capacity to comprehend the bargain, its benefits, and its
burdens. Yet, the advice of an attorney does not eliminate the constrained
choice that may be facing the party. In almost every contracting situation, the
presence of an attorney is helpful in explaining the nature of the deal and all
possible alternatives. Thus, the bargainer, represented by counsel, can under-
stand the proposed contract fully and can understand the consequences of vari-
ous paths of action.226 The presence of an attorney cannot create alternatives
that were not already in existence, however. In other words, the attorney has no
effect on the ultimate array of alternatives the bargainer faces. So, for example,
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Il1. App. Ct. 2002). See also Kostritsky, supra
note 3, at 599-600 (the language implies a psychological test).
223 778 N.E.2d 1153 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
224 Id. at 1162 (quoting Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 609, 615 (111.
App. Ct. 1999) (quoting Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 423 NE.2d 578, 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ill. 1962)))).
225 See, e.g., Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545,
546 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("[I]n any event, when the signer of an agreement is sophisticated in
business matters and has access to and in fact obtains advice of counsel, the defense of duress is
not available to void the contract."); Frame v. Booth, Wade & Campbell, 519 S.E.2d 237, 241
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (After noting that the party claiming duress was "a sophisticated business-
man" and that "he had access to and consulted with counsel of his choice," the court concluded:
"Even if we were to conclude that Booth's actions constituted economic duress, we therefore
would also conclude that he waived any reliance upon this defense.").
226 See, e.g., Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (before agreeing to marriage,
an elderly person consulted two attorneys). See also Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country
Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2001). The court seemed to be using the sophistication
of the parties and the involvement of attorneys as evidence of the fact that the parties were aware
of the alternative, which was reasonable. The court stated: "Clearly, Dunes consisted of sophisti-
cated members and investors, and was well represented by experienced, competent lawyers.
Dunes' decision to enter into this settlement agreement was the result of an informed and deliber-
ate decision. The proposals ... were not unreasonable alternatives." 623 N.W.2d at 492.
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in Krilich v. American National Bank and Trust Co.,227 the bargainer complain-
ing of duress, Bongi, claimed that the other party threatened to breach an earlier
contract to disastrous effect on Bongi if Bongi did not agree to purchase another
property. The party agreed to the purchase but then failed to pay on the note,
claiming duress. That party, if the facts are accepted as claimed, agreed to the
purchase arrangement because the other alternative, to refuse the deal, would
lead to the other party breaching a contract to improve another property. That
breach would cause Bongi to suffer "'financial collapse', bankruptcy, and pro-
tracted litigation.' ' 22 8 The fact that Bongi was represented by counsel and had
the benefit of counsel's advice does not change the situation presented by the
opposing party. Yet, the court relied in part on the fact that Bongi was repre-
sented by counsel during the contract negotiation to affirm the lower court's
grant of a motion to dismiss.229 Similarly, in Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall
Co., 23 the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment denying a duress
claim involving a release. The court stated: "Indeed, '[w]here an experienced
businessman takes sufficient time, seeks the advice of counsel and understands
the content of what he is signing he cannot claim the execution of the release
was a product of duress. ' '23 1 The courts of Pennsylvania have stated that the
opportunity to consult with an attorney, even if an attorney is not in fact con-
sulted, defeats a claim of duress.232
227 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
228 Id. at 1163.
229 Id. at 1163 ("Because Bongiovanni enjoyed access to legal counsel during the three-month
negotiation period and because Bongi had an adequate potential judicial remedy, wc conclude that
the trial court correctly dismissed the affirmative defenses and counterclaim alleging economic
duress.").
230 572 S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 2002).
231 Id. at 906 (quoting Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
See also Hyman v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (D.S.C. 2001) ("Hyman's assertions
of duress are substantially undermined by the fact that he was represented by counsel throughout
the termination of Agreement and the bankruptcy proceedings."); Rubin v. Laser, 703 N.E.2d 453,
459-60 (111. App. Ct. 1998) ("[T]he party who executed the agreement, moreover, is a lawyer and
was represented by counsel in the negotiation of the release. There is no indication that his will
was overborne."); Patton v. Wood County Humane Soc'y, 798 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003) (noting that the party was allowed to seek the advice of counsel); Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund v. Bryden House Ltd. P'ship, 719 N.E.2d 646, 652-53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (find-
ing no duress, the court stated, "we have sophisticated parties and their attorneys dealing on an
equal footing"). But see Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 176 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001). In Krantz the trial court granted summary judgment on the duress claim because the
plaintiff "'had reasonable alternatives at the time he signed the Teaming Agreement and was not
facing any financial jeopardy ... [and] that his attorney was reviewing it."' The appellate court
stated: "We do not, however, consider these statements sufficient in themselves to negate the
duress claim as a matter of law." Krantz, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 176.
232 See, e.g., Easton v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 604, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(quoting Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 893 (3d Cir. 1975)) ("Under
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The passage of time is another factor that is relevant in determining the
reasonable alternatives known to the party claiming duress. Yet, the passage of
time cannot enlarge the set of options the bargainer faces. Courts should take
care not to place too much emphasis on this factor when the claim is duress, not
undue influence.
233
Likewise, the expertise or sophistication of the party claiming duress is
helpful to a court in determining whether that party was aware of alternatives.
Yet, such a factor cannot change the deal presented by the other party. If the
situation is one in which the party must consent to the deal or face bankruptcy,
no amount of sophistication can change those alternatives. Some courts have
relied, perhaps inappropriately, on the sophistication of the party to deny a claim
of duress. 234 Courts must guard against using such a factor too broadly.
C. The Duress Doctrine Should Not Directly Regulate Substantive Fairness
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, in section 176(2), states:
Pennsylvania law 'where the contracting party is free to come and go to consult with counsel,
there can be no duress in the absence of threats of actual bodily harm."'); SKF USA, Inc. v. Work-
ers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Smalls), 714 A.2d 496, 501 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) ("Where, as here, a
party had a reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel before entering into a contract,
the party may not seek to invalidate the contract on the basis of economic duress.").
233 See Gouldstone v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 514 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). While
finding no threat, the court also noted that the party claiming duress had more than a week to
decide, "thus giving Gouldstone time to seek an attorney or to otherwise determine if the 'threat'
was genuine." See also DeLuca v. Bear Steams & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D. Mass. 2001)
(in finding no duress, the court noted that the party was given two days to consider and consult
with an attorney).
234 See, e.g., Mathias v. Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("experienced busi-
nessmen" represented by attorneys); Golden v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 702 N.E.2d 581, 589
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("Golden was a legally sophisticated attorney who negotiated the severance
agreement over the course of several months"; no duress found). The West Virginia Supreme
Court in Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall Co., 572 S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 2002), stated:
While economic duress may reach large business entities as well as the
"proverbial little old lady in tennis shoes," Anderson & Anderson Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Latimer, 162 W. Va. 803, 807 n.2, 257 S.E.2d 878, 881
n.2 (1979), when the parties are sophisticated business entities, releases
should be voided only in "'extreme and extraordinary cases."' Davis &
Assoc., Inc. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting VKK Corp. v. N.F.L., 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d
Cir. 2001). Indeed, "[w]here an experienced businessman takes sufficient
time, seeks the advice of counsel and understands the content of what he
is signing he cannot claim the execution of the release was a product of
duress." Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768
(Mo.Ct.App.1987) (citing Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 771
F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1985)).
572 S.E.2d at 906.
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A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair
terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not
significantly benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation
of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the
party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegiti-
mate ends.
235
Thus, this section provides for duress to be used to regulate not only the
fairness of the process of the bargain but also the fairness of the substance of the
bargain. This section was a response to entreaties by some commentators that
duress ought to directly regulate substance.
236
Courts have disagreed. In recent history, courts generally have not used
the duress doctrine to directly regulate substantive fairness of bargains. Even
so, modem courts easily could have bowed to the power of the Restatement
(Second) and adopted section 176(2) or at least the position it states. Very few
courts have done so. Only a few courts, in the more than twenty years since the
publication of the Restatement (Second), have mentioned section 176(2).237 In
a very few cases, the court has relied upon section 176(2). 238 In several cases,
the court cites or quotes all of section 176 and it is not possible to determine
whether the court relied on the substantive fairness provisions of section 176(2)
to decide the matter239 or, rather, on the more traditional statement of section
176(1). 240 In a few cases, the court cited or quoted section 176(2) but appar-
235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
236 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 29, at 598 (espousing consideration of the justness of the
resulting transaction); Dawson, supra note 2, at 282-83 (same). For a later argument for substan-
tive fairness regulation, see Fingarette, supra note 12, at 71-82.
237 See Shufford v. Integon Indem. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Ala 1999); Am. Life Ins.
Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Del. 1999), afid in part, rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir.
2001); In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (1989); Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Court,
954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998); Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757 (Md. 1978); Richards v. Allianz
Life Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., 614 N.E.2d
765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002); Andreini v. Hult-
gren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993); Mach. Hauling, Inc. v. Steel, 384 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1989).
238 See Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Boud v. SDNCO,
Inc., 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
239 See Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998); Maust v. Bank One
Columbus, N.A., 614 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
240 See discussion accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
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ently did not apply it. 24  A few courts, without reference to the Restatement,
have required that the resulting transaction be measured for fairness.
242
In Andreini v. Hultgren,243 the court engaged in the clearest adoption of
section 176(2). In that case, the plaintiff had sustained paralysis of the hands
after a surgery. 244 The plaintiff sued the physicians and the hospital, claiming
malpractice. 24  The plaintiff claimed that a release he signed before a second
surgery did not block his action because he had signed the release under du-246
ress. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians
and the hospital.247 The Supreme Court of Utah explicitly adopted sections 175
and 176248 and specifically relied on section 176(2)(b). 249 Thus, the court de-
cided the matter on the basis that the "resulting exchange [was] not on fair
terms" 250 and that "the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation
of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making
the threat."2 51 The Andreini court reversed the grant of summary judgment.
252
241 See Shufford v. Integon Indem. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Ala 1999); Am. Life Ins.
Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Del. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 265 F.3d 1054 (3d Cir.
2001); In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Eckstein v. Eckstein,
379 A.2d 757 (Md. 1978); Mach. Hauling, Inc. v. Steel, 384 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1989).
242 See, e.g., Mason v. Ariz. Educ. Loan Mktg. Assistance Corp. (In re Mason), 300 BR. 160,
167 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (the court concluded that the agreement was unfair because it robbed
the debtor of the right to discharge of the debt in bankruptcy); Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145,
1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)(quoting Barbara Weisman, Trustee v. Kaspar, 661 A.2d 530, 549 n.
15 (1995)) ("For a party to demonstrate duress, it 'must prove [1] a wrongful act or threat [2]
that left the victim no reasonable alternative, and [3] to which the victim in fact acceded, and
that [4] the resulting transaction was unfair to the victim."').
243 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). See also James Barnett, Recent Developments in Utah Case
Law, Utah's Standards for Determining Duress, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 265 (1995).
244 Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 915, 917 (Utah 1993).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 920.
247 Id. at 917.
248 Id. at 921 ("We agree with this reasoning and explicitly adopt the legal standards of
duress set forth in sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.").
249 Id. at 922.
250 Id ("This evidence is sufficient to establish the legal possibility that the 'resulting ex-
change'--defendants' unfulfilled promise to correct Andreini's injury exchanged for Andre-
ini's release of all claims against defendants--is 'not on fair terms' within the meaning of
section 176(2) of the Restatement."). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS §
176(2) (1981).
251 860 P.2d at 922 ("Based on this evidence, a jury could find that defendants engaged in
unfair dealing that significantly increased the effectiveness of their threat to refuse to under-
take the corrective surgery."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(b)
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The courts' rather stark reticence to apply the substantive fairness provi-
sions of the Restatement (Second) section 176 indicates the collective unwill-
ingness of the courts to make duress determinations on the basis of the substan-
tive fairness. The courts have spoken with their actions. Even when given the
imprimatur of the Restatement (Second), the courts refuse.
Courts do not refuse because they are incapable of making such deter-
minations. They are obviously capable; they police substantive fairness with the
doctrine of unconscionability. 253  Courts refuse because precedent tells them
that the duress doctrine has not been so used in the past. Further, the tradition in
contract law has been to not evaluate bargains on a substantive basis, 254 though.. 255
there have been exceptions. Thus, modern courts view even a peppercorn aso .. .. 256
consideration. Courts do not determine sufficiency of consideration. While
some doctrines, such as unconscionability, do require a review of the substance
of the deal, these doctrines are relatively new to contract law. The fact that the
unconscionability doctrine requires a substantive fairness analysis does not
mean that the duress doctrine should require a substantive fairness analysis also.
The duress doctrine is and should remain a doctrine distinct from unconscion-
ability and should remain within the bounds of the traditional doctrine.
257
(1981).
252 Id. at 923.
253 See generally James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfin-
ished Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2000) (discussing substantive review of the bargain
with the doctrine of unconscionability); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reap-
praisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (same).
254 See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529,
1529 (2002) (courts refrain from substance analysis). Early English law concerned itself with
fairness. This changed as "liberal individualism became more entrenched in the law."
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 21-22. See also Spencer N. Thai, The Inequality of Bargaining
Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, 8 OxF. J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 21
(1988) ("The justification for the principle that courts should not investigate the adequacy of con-
sideration (or fairness of the transaction) is that it would mark a move away from a market econ-
omy to one which is judicially supervised.").
255 See Dawson, supra note 2, at 277-82 (discussing modem exceptions to the refusal to sub-
stantively evaluate the consideration exchanged).
256 See ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 153-54 (2d ed. 1959) ("The
equivalent theory must wrestle at the outset with the doctrine that inadequacy of consideration is
immaterial so that the equivalent is often Pickwickian."). See generally EDWARD JENKS, THE
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION 12 (1892). One commentator has stated: "One of
the most frequently and emphatically declared axioms of contract law is that our courts are not
concerned with the equivalence of the consideration given for a promise." Dalzell, supra note 9,
at 237. See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twenti-
eth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265 (1999) (discuss-
ing courts' reticence to evaluate consideration).
257 See Stewart, supra note 3, at 176-77 ("The hallmark of duress is the impairment of the
second party's autonomy, while the hallmark of unconscionability is the substantive unfairness of
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Perhaps more important than precedent is the collective opinion of the
courts as to their proper role. The reluctance with which courts find duress at all
and the reluctance of courts to adopt an approach involving review of the sub-
stantive fairness of the deal suggests that courts of today are highly influenced
by the notion of freedom of contract. Perhaps their view, independent of prece-
dent, is that courts should leave substance to the contractors and not interfere
with the self-determination of the contractors except in clear cases of application
of traditional doctrines along traditional lines. If courts place priority on the
public policy of freedom of contract, they are not likely to expand on traditional
contract doctrines so as to do violence to the freedom of contract. Thus, the
courts have not expanded upon the traditional doctrine of duress to analyze the
substantive fairness of a bargain. The courts' inaction regarding section 176(2)
and the more general refusal to treat the duress doctrine as a substantive fairness
doctrine are not creatures of happenstance but rather are policy choices.
Given the courts' well-grounded unwillingness to use the duress doc-
trine as a regulator of the substantive fairness of deals, the ivory tower should
accept the failure of the experiment of section 176(2) and substantive fairness
review generally. Duress should not be hobbled by being made more confusing
in definition or less appealing to courts in light of those courts' favored policy,
freedom of contract.
D. Threats That Should Be Recognized as Bases for Duress
1. The Present Lack of Clarity
The duress doctrine has never applied to all situations of constrained
choice. 258 No one has ever been allowed to have a contract set aside on the ba-
sis of duress simply because that person had no choice but to enter into the deal.
Rather, the doctrine has set aside a contract only when the party not claiming
duress has taken action that makes that party blameworthy. If that party is
blameworthy in creating the situation of constrained choice, the generally offen-
sive nature of setting aside the contract is less compelling. The all-important
determination, then, is whether that party is blameworthy. This determination is
the rub. Modem courts have a variety of views on what finding is necessary.
Some courts do not appear to understand the standards they espouse.
In the early days of the duress doctrine, there was little doubt about
blameworthiness and thus the application of the doctrine. Duress applied only
when one party threatened the other party with death or serious bodily injury or
the bargain."). But see DiMatteo, supra note 256 (discussing generally the move to fairness
analysis); Sharma, supra note 131, at 112 (noting the move to fairness consideration).
258 See Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms-American and Scandina-
vian, 50 Am. J. COMp. L. 131, 145 (2002) ("All choices are constrained choices simply by virtue
of the fact of being made in the context of society.").
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actually imprisoned that party. 259 Killing or seriously injuring or imprisoning a
party were crimes so no one would dispute that the threatener had taken action
that marked the threatener as blameworthy. Assuming that the other require-
ments of duress were satisfied, setting aside the resulting contract was therefore
just and justifiable for both the constrained party and the constraining party.
Once the doctrine expanded to recognize that duress could exist with other
threats, the courts became confused as to the proper standard for determining
which threats could be the basis of a duress claim. Modem courts have done
nothing to clarify the situation.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 175(1) states that duress
requires "an improper threat. ' 2 6° Section 176(1) defines "an improper threat" as
one threatening a crime or tort, one that would be a crime or tort itself, one that
is a threat of criminal prosecution, one that is a bad faith threat to use civil proc-
ess, and one which is a "breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with the recipient.' 261  Section 176(2) presents situations in which
threats are improper in part because the transaction is unfair.262 As discussed in
an earlier section, the substantive analysis suggested by section 176(2) has not
been part of the duress tradition, is not now generally part of the duress doctrine,
and should not be a part of the duress doctrine.263 Thus, the present discussion
does not include such a definition of "an improper threat."
Some courts have followed the teachings of section 176(1). 264 More of-
ten, however, courts state that an actionable threat is one that is "wrongful."
265
259 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 ( 5th ed. 2003). Blackstone
stated,
A fear of battery ... is no duress; neither is the fear of having one's house
burned, or one's goods taken away or destroyed because in these cases, ...
should the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering
equivalent damages: but no suitable atonement can be made for the loss of
life, or limb.
Id. at 316 (quoting I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 131 (Lewis's ed.)).
260 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
261 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981).
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
263 See discussion supra section V.C.
264 See, e.g, Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4 th 164, 176 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). The court in Krantz also listed the factor of whether the threat was for illegitimate ends.
Id. This factor is contained in the fairness portion of section 176 but the Restatement requires a
finding that resulting transaction is unfair in addition to the illegitimate ends finding. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981). The Krantz court does not mention this
additional fairness requirement. See also Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2003). The Rumsfeld court did not rely on section 176(1) explicitly but stated that
duress can be based on a threat that is illegal, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in an existing contract, or a breach of contract without a good faith belief such action is per-
missible.
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Some courts explain that "wrongful" can be expansive in scope. For example,
the New Jersey Superior Court in Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP,
266
stated that "wrongful" can include "wrongful, not necessarily in a legal, but in a
moral or equitable sense." 267 Of course, courts do not delineate the kinds of
threats that could be deemed morally wrong. Some courts apply the "wrongful"
threat test in a manner that makes it clear that wrongful threats or threats of
wrongful action need not be synonymous with illegal threats or threats of illegal
action.268 Other courts use a combined test of "wrongful or unlawful." 269 The
use of both terms in the alternative may create the inference that a threat may be
the basis of a duress claim if it is unlawful or if it is not unlawful but is other-
wise wrongful. The question is then the composition of that latter set of situa-
tions.
265 See, e.g., Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 1290 (8th
Cir. 1977) ("wrongful coercive acts"); Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d
857, 863 (W.D. Va. 2001) (quoting Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 450, 452 (Va.
1993)) ('wrongful act"'); Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) ("wrong-
ful act"); Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288, 1290 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2001) ("wrongful act"); Hughes v.
Pullman, 36 P.3d 339, 343 (Mont. 2001) ("wrongful act"); In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 797
(N.H. 2002) ("exerted pressure wrongfully"); Adalian v. Stuyvesant Plaza, Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d
739, 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("wrongful threat"); Fred Ehrlich, P.C. v. Tullo, 710 N.Y.S.2d
572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("wrongful threat"); Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country
Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001) ("coercive wrongful act").
266 749 A.2d 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000).
267 Id. at 412 (quoting Cont'l Bank v. Barclay Riding Acad., Inc., 459 A.2d 1163, 1175 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983)). See also N. Fabrication Co. v. UNOCAL, 980 P.2d 958, 961
(Alaska 1999) (quoting Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d
15, 22 (Alaska 1978)) (including acts that are "criminal, tortuous, or even merely 'wrongful in the
moral sense"'); Krilich v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153, 1162 (111. App. Ct.
2002) (citing Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen, & Dixon, 707 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
("The acts or threats complained of must be wrongful; however, the term 'wrongful' is not limited
to acts that are criminal, tortuous, or in violation of contractual duty. They must extend to acts
that are also wrongful in a moral sense.")). This approach was rejected by Dunes Hospitality,
L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2001). The Dunes court stated that
"[i]nstruction ... [twenty-four] allowed the consideration of a wrongful act to include those
Imerely wrongful in the moral sense."' Id. at 491. The court continued: "We reject these as im-
proper statements of the law of economic duress." Id at 490.
268 See, e.g., Jamestown Farmers Elevator, 552 F.2d at 1290-91 (a threat to put another out of
business can be wrongful).
269 See, e.g., Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Southeast Rural Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545,
547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("wrongful or unlawful"); Suwanee Swifty Stores, Inc. v. Nationsbank,
N.A., 536 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("wrongful or unlawful"); Sheet Metal Workers
Nat'l Pension Fund v. Bryden House Ltd. P'ship, 719 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ("a
wrongful or unlawful act or threat"). But see Berardi v. Meadowbrook Mall Co., 572 S.E.2d 900,
905 (W. Va. 2002) ("unlawful threats or wrongful, oppressive, or unconscionable").
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Other courts state that the threat must be "unlawful." 270 Even with this
choice of words, there is lack of clarity. Would a threat that would be a breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an existing contract be "unlaw-
ful"? Such conduct is not illegal in the sense of being a crime or even a tort. At
least one court has stated that bad faith conduct within an existing contract can
be "unlawful" for purposes of duress.
27
'
In contrast, many courts, regardless of the language they use to state the
test for an actionable threat, use additional language that seems to indicate that
only criminal threats or threats of criminal conduct can be the basis of duress.
For example, in Hurd v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen and Dixon,272 the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court defined "wrongful" to include wrongs in a "moral sense" as well
as a legal sense. The court then stated: "[T]he defense cannot be predicated
upon a demand that is lawful or upon doing or threatening to do that which a
party has a legal right to do."' 2 7 3 This phrase about duress not being based on
anything the actor has a legal right to do has been stated and restated by numer-
ous courts. 2 74 If the literal truth of this statement is the rule, then only if the
270 See, e.g., Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242
( 1 0th Cir. 1990) ("unlawful act"); Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("unlawfully made" threat).
271 See Applied Genetics Int'l, 912 F.2d at 1242 (a threat to report to the SEC and a threat to
breach a contract, made in bad faith, can be "unlawful").
272 707 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
273 Id. at 614.
274 See, e.g., Suwannee Swifty Stores, Inc. v. NationsBank, N.A., 536 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000) (quoting Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bowen Motors, 306 S.E.2d 675,679
(1983)) ("It is not duress to threaten to do what one has a legal right to do."'); In re Estate of
Davis, 832 So. 2d 534, 538 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Duckworth v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 150 So. 2d 163, 163 (Miss. 1963)) ("[Economic duress] cannot be predicated upon a demand
which a party has a legal right to do."); Crase v. Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471, 475 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(duress requires a threat "to do something which they had no legal right to do"); Lyons v. Lyons,
734 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (N.Y.App. Div. 2001) (quoting Matter of Rychlick v. Coughlin, 472
N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (N.Y. App. Div. ), afd, 468 N.E.2d 702 (N.Y. 1984)) ("A mere 'threat to do
that which one has the legal right to do does not constitute duress."'); Ehrlich v. Tullo, 710
N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("wrongful threat") ("threatened exercise of a legal
right is not economic duress"); Patton v. Wood County Humane Soc'y, 798 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003) (it is not an improper threat if the party threatening was legally entitled to do the
threatened act); Flynt Eng'g Co. v. Cox, 99 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Wind-
ham v. Alexander, West, & Poehner, 887 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App. 1994)) ("to do what one has a
legal right to do is insufficient to create duress"); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509, 511 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing Brown v. Aztec Rig Equip., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 835, 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996))
("For duress to be a contract defense, it must consist of a threat to do something the threatening
party has no legal right to do."); Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
("Duress requires proof of a threat to do something which the threatening party has no right to
do."). See Dawson, supra note 2, at 287. Dawson stated: "No single formula has achieved so
wide a circulation in the duress cases as the statement that 'It is not duress to threaten to do what
there is a legal right to do.' Certainly no other formula is anything like so misleading." See also
Hale, Bargaining, supra note 10, at 613 (discussing Hardie & Lane v. Chilton [1928] 2 K.B. 306,
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actor breaks the law can there be a successful claim of duress. A bad faith threat
to breach a contract could not be a basis of duress because a contracting party
does have the right to breach. The exercise of that right may entail the payment
of damages, of course. As early as 1898 Justice Holmes begged to differ with
courts requiring a strict notion of unlawfulness for an actionable threat. In Sils-
bee v. Webber 75 he wrote: "[I]t does not follow that, because you cannot be
made to answer for the act, you may use the threat."'2 76 However, it is possible
that courts, when using the above statement, are being imprecise. It is possible
that those courts would argue that breach of a contract in bad faith is an act the
breacher had no right to do and, therefore, such a threat would be actionable.
The meaning of the statement can be unclear, especially if the court has made
other, more expansive statements about the required nature of the threat.
Occasionally, a court is both more limiting and clearer in defining the
type of threat that can be the basis of a duress finding. For example, in one case
the court refused to apply the duress doctrine because the party's conduct was
not "illegal." 277 The court continued: "It is well established that where the al-
leged menace was ... to stop performance under a contract or to exercise a legal
right, there is no actionable duress." 278 Thus, according to this case only crimi-
nal threats or threats of criminal acts can be the basis of a duress finding. Per-
haps one of the most confusing statements is that of the Texas Court of Appeals
in ABB Kraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft v. Brownsville Barge & Crane, Inc.
2 7 9
The court stated that economic duress required "(1) a threat to do something that
a party has no legal right to do; (2) illegal exaction or some fraud or deception;
and (3) imminent restraint so as to destroy free agency without present means of
protection." 
280
What is clear after this survey of relatively recent cases is that there is
much confusion in the courts as to the standard to use for identifying a threat
that can be the basis for a finding of duress. Much of this confusion perhaps can
be blamed on blind regurgitation of language from earlier cases and imprecise
drafting of opinions. No one can dispute that the use of "wrongful" as a test,
without further explanation, is less than elucidating. A definition of wrongful-
ness in terms of "moral" wrong is likewise not helpful. Further, courts have
in which Scruton, L.J., stated that the threat was not actionable if "'the threatener has a legal right
to do what he threatens."' Hale responded: "The statement is also too broad.").
275 50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898).
276 Id. at 556.
277 Gubitz v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 692 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
278 Id. at 140.
279 115 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
280 Id. at 294 (citing King v. Bishop, 879 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Simpson v.
MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102, 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)).
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relied on language such as the statement that duress cannot be based on a threat
to do what the party has a legal right to do that originated in a time before the
general notion of economic duress became widely recognized. Courts make
such a statement and at the same time rely on language from other opinions such
as a statement that a threat must be wrongful-without regard of whether the
two statements are consistent with each other. This confusion cannot continue.
For the duress doctrine to survive, there must be clarity with regard to the stan-
dard for an actionable threat.
2. A Proper Standard
This lack of clarity is but part of the problem, however. It is also impor-
tant that courts apply a standard that is not only clear but also appropriate.
Courts could, after all, remedy the clarity problem by recognizing only threats of
criminal activity as a basis for the application of the duress doctrine. Other
courts might accept only threats of criminal or tortious activity while even other
courts might accept criminal, tortious, and bad faith activity. Unanimity of ap-
proach would be optimal, but not if the courts apply a flawed standard.
A return to the purpose of the threat requirement is helpful at this point.
As the court in Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc.281 stated:
The underlying concern of the economic duress doctrine is the
enforcement in the marketplace of certain minimal standards of
business ethics .... They include equitable notions of fairness
and propriety which preclude the wrongful exploitation of busi-
ness exigencies to obtain disproportionate exchanges of value..
. The economic duress doctrine serves as a last resort to cor-
rect these aberrations when conventional alternatives are un-
availing. 
2 2
The threat requirement provides the selection mechanism for choosing
which of the constrained choice contracting situations should be set aside. Con-
tracts should be set aside when it is just and justifiable to do so-that is, when
societal expectations of the sanctity of contracts would not be offended because
of the peculiar nature of the particular situation. Setting aside a contract on the
basis of duress is just and justifiable when one party has no reasonable alterna-
tive to the problematic bargain and when the other party has been proven to be
particularly blameworthy regarding the constrained nature of the deal. No one
would disagree with the notion that a criminal threat or a threat of criminal con-
duct is blameworthy conduct for purposes of the duress doctrine. Yet, at this
point of societal and contract evolution, other sorts of threats are sufficiently
281 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
282 Id. at 89-90.
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blameworthy as well. Perhaps the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
176(1) strikes the appropriate balance between the three most relevant interests:
the threatener's blameworthiness, the protection of the constrained party's inter-
ests, and the societal interest in the sanctity of contract. Section 176(1) includes
as actionable threats criminal and tortious threats, threats of criminal prosecu-
tion, bad faith threats to use civil process, and threats that are a breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing under an existing contract.
283
Each of these categories of threats shares the characteristic of being
condemned elsewhere in the law. Thus, by using these categories to determine
actionable threats, no novel blameworthy analysis is needed. If a threat is in fact
a threat to commit a crime, as determined by the criminal law, it can be the basis
of a duress claim.
Tortious threats clearly are condemned independent of the duress doc-
trine. Likewise, the law condemns, independent of the duress doctrine, a threat
which breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relation-
ship. In the case of both tortious threats and such bad faith threats, the actor
must pay a price for the actions.
Courts long have viewed threats of criminal prosecution in the context
of a private contract negotiation as contrary to public policy.284 As a result,
courts often have denied enforcement of contracts involving promises of no
criminal prosecution in exchange for other consideration. 285 This denial has
been on the basis of public policy, not duress. The theory behind the lack of
enforcement is that the public judicial process should not be co-opted for private
gain.286 Thus, threats of criminal prosecution are also condemned independ-
ently of the duress doctrine, just as crimes are. Finally, bad faith use of civil
process is also a use of the public judicial process for inappropriate ends.287
283 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981).
284 See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 83.1 (2003) ("[A]ny bargain for
the purpose of stifling a criminal prosecution, whether or not the bargain is criminal, is always
contrary to public policy and unenforceable."). See also Berman v. Coakley, 137 N.E. 667, 668
(Mass. 1923) ("the course ofjustice cannot be defeated for the benefit of an individual").
285 See, e.g., Mason v. Arizona Educ. Loan Mktg. Assistance Corp. (In re Mason), 300 B.R.
160 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (threat of prosecution and incarceration if the debtor did not agree to
a consolidation); Baker v. Citizens Bank of Guntersville, 208 So. 2d 601, 606 (Ala. 1968) (citing
Clark v. Colbert, 67 Ala. 92 (1880); Moog v. Strang, 69 Ala. 98 (1881); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Charles, 31 So. 558 (Ala. 1901)) ("a contract based upon a promise or agreement to conceal or
keep secret a crime which has been committed is opposed to public policy and offensive to the
law"); Murphy v. Rochford, 371 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) ("An agreement not to
prosecute is void because it is against public policy, as well as possibly constituting a criminal
offense."). See also Bargaining, supra note 10, at 619 (discussing this type of threat).
286 See Dawson, supra note 2, at 285-86 ("This development has been fitted into the classic
conception of duress by describing the pressure as inherently improper, since processes intended
for the vindication of public interests are misapplied when used to enforce civil liability.").
287 WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 43. See, e.g., Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364 (1874).
After a debtor's ice wagon was loaded with ice, the creditor obtained a writ of attachment for the
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Such conduct actually may rise to the level of a tort.288 While the independent
condemnation of such conduct is not as tangible as that for other categories of
threats, condemnation exists nonetheless.
There is little support for an argument that one who threatens in any of
these ways is not blameworthy. Likewise, the damage to the notion of freedom
of contract seems slight. Assuming that the choice of one party is constrained to
the point that the party has no reasonable alternative to the bargain, applying the
duress doctrine in these threat situations seems just and justifiable.
A refreshing example of clarity of standard is Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY,
Inc.289 The government entered into a contract with Freedom NY that provided
that Freedom NY would supply meals ready to eat (MREs) and the government• . 290
would pay for the MREs in a series of progress payments. The government
sought to have the initial contract modified and refused to provide progress
payments on that first contract unless Freedom NY agreed to the modifica-291
tion. Freedom NY agreed to the modification but later claimed that the modi-
fication was the product of duress. 292 The Rumsfeld court clearly stated that
precedent had 'done away with the requirement of an illegal act.' ' '293  The
Rumsfeld court explained that duress can be based on "wrongful" conduct and
defined "wrongful" as "(1) illegal, (2) a breach of an express provision of the
contract without a good faith belief that the action was permissible under the
contract, or (3) a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.",294 The court then concluded that the withholding of progress payments to
obtain Freedom NY's agreement to the modification was, indeed, "wrong-
ful." 
2 9 5
While the Rumsfeld court did not adopt the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 176(1) per se, the court was clear in its statement of the stan-
wagon. The debtor paid so he could obtain his wagon before the ice melted. The creditor had the
right to obtain the writ but the bad faith approach to obtaining the ice resulted in a finding of du-
ress. See generally Dawson, supra note 29, at 574 (noting the competing interest of "sanctity of
transaction" and the resolution of civil disputes); Dalzell, supra note 212, at 345.
288 The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process might be implicated. See Dawson,
supra note 29, at 576-77 (discussing malicious prosecution and abuse of process),
289 329 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
290 Id. at 1322-23.
291 Id. at 1324.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1330 (quoting Sys. Technical Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1383, 1387-88
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
294 Id.
295 329 F.3d at 1330-31. See also Sys. Technical Assocs., 699 F.2d at 1387-88 (Fed. Cir.
1983); David Nassif Assocs. v. United States, 644 F.2d 4 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Johnson v. Drake &
Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (Ct. Cf. 1976).
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dard to determine actionable threats and stated a standard very similar to that of
the Restatement (Second) section 176(1). The court clearly noted that illegality
of the threat was not the touchstone. This is quite a positive statement for im-
provement of the duress doctrine and its use by the courts. In addition, the
Rumsfeld court clarified that one kind of legal but wrongful threat involved bad
faith breach of contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which is a part of every contract. This duty long has been recognized as a part of
every contract. Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
• • ,,296
its performance and its enforcement. The Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) states: "Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."
2 97
The courts might fear recognizing breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing as a basis for duress because of uncertainty as to the parameters of
good and bad faith. The actual standard of determining good faith or the lack of
good faith has been described as "frustratingly elusive." 298 The UCC defines
the duty as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing."2 99 The comment to section 2-209 of the UCC provides
further guidance by stating that in the contract modification scenario, "the extor-
tion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a
violation of the duty of good faith."
300
One could argue that at least in the UCC context the duress doctrine
need not reach the modification scenario because section 2-209 independently
invalidates the modification. Some courts have applied section 2-209 in this
manner.301 Note, however, that the invalidation language appears in the com-
296 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
297 U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004). See also STEvEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL
GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT (Little Brown 1995); Steven
J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69
IOWA L. REv. 497 (1984); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss,
Proposed Standards for Evaluating when the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealings has been
Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1996); Paul J. Powers,
Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 18 J.L. & COM. 333 (1999); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty
of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert
S. Summers, "Good Faith " in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
298 See Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to
the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025, 1033 (2003).
299 U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2004).
300 U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 2 (2004).
301 See, e.g., T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pie-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1986);
Roth Steel Prod. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 ( 6 " Cir. 1983). See also Lumber Enters.,
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mentary only, not in the UCC proper. Thus, the power of the invalidation lan-
guage is questionable. 302 The issue of the invalidation language had been the
subject of scholarly discussion before the 2001 revisions to the UCC.30 3 Ini-
tially, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws proposed a change that would move the good faith
requirement from commentary to text. The proposal stated: "An agreement
made in good faith modifying a contract under this article needs no considera-
tion to be binding." 30 4 Ultimately, no change was suggested to section 2-209.3o5
Section 89 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that a
modification of an executory contract is binding "(a) if the modification is fair
and equitable in view of circumstance not anticipated by the parties when the
contract was made; or (b) to the extent provided by statute; or (c) to the extent
that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of position in reli-
ance on the promise. '3° 6 Comment b to section 89 states in part:
The limitation to a modification which is 'fair and equitable'
goes beyond absence of coercion and requires an objectively
demonstrable reason for seeking a modification .... The reason
for modification must rest in circumstances not 'anticipated' as
part of the context in which the contract was made, but a frus-
trating event may be unanticipated for this purpose if it was not
adequately covered, even though it was foreseen as a remote
possibility. When such a reason is present, the relative financial
strength of the parties, the formality with which the modifica-
tion is made, the extent to which it is performed or relied on and
other circumstances may be relevant to show or negate imposi-
tion or unfair surprise.
307
Inc. v. Hansen, 846 P.2d 1046 (Mont. 1993).
302 See Henry Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C. L. REv. 615 (1982);
Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doc-
trine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L, REv. 849 (1979); Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A
Sequential Approach to Analyzing Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA.
L. REv. 49 (2001).
303 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 302; Johnston, supra note 197; Mather, supra note 302.
304 U.C.C. § 2-209 (2004) (Proposed NCCYSL draft, 3-1-99) quoted by Russell, supra note
302, at 87.
305 U*C.C. §2-209 (2004) (2003 Amendments).
306 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b (1981). One commentator has sug-
gested that section 89 and U.C.C. section 2-209 direct courts to the same evidence and conclusion.
See Johnston, supra note 197, at 382-83 ("objective evidence that the modification was actually
motivated by an unanticipated change in circumstances that would make performance under the
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While some courts have considered this section of the Restatement
when evaluating a contract modification, 308 the duress doctrine remains the ma-
jor consideration for all sorts of contracts, executory or otherwise. Thus, the
recognition of bad faith within a contractual relationship is imperative. 309 Bad
faith identifies the threatener as sufficiently blameworthy such that justice is
best served by not enforcing a contract resulting from such a constrained choice
bargain.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are no easy solutions to the duress doctrine's present plight. A re-
view of recent cases reveals that a shocking amount of repair is necessary to
salvage the doctrine. The doctrine originally existed as a tool to police bargains
that were the product of significantly constrained choice when that constraint
resulted from blameworthy conduct of the other party to the bargain. It should
continue to do so as a way of maximizing justice.
Courts of today have become mired in confusing precedent and related
doctrines and have, thus, lost their way. To once more gain sight of the ultimate
goal of justice, courts must abandon the practice of analyzing the presence or
absence of free will to identify a situation of constrained choice. The majority
of traditional duress situations are situations in which the constrained party does
exercise free will. Courts have stated the free will analysis in absolute terms. If
courts apply the stated test in an intellectually honest manner, the free will test
should always result in a finding of no duress.
Such a test is also hopelessly vague because a court is asked to deter-
mine the presence or absence of free will without guidance as to how the court
should do so. This vagueness has created an environment in which courts inap-
propriately consider factors relating to decision-making capacity better suited to
the doctrine of undue influence. Courts should limit consideration for duress
purposes to the traditional situation of a bargainer who acts with significantly
constrained choice but very often with rational decision-making capacity.
The "free will" test must be scrapped in favor of the more instrumental
"no reasonable alternative" test. This test more appropriately determines
whether a situation is one of substantially constrained choice. Use of such a test
also will minimize the consideration of the contractor's decision-making capac-
ity and will refocus attention on the constrained nature of the choice before even
the most able contractor.
terms of the original contract unprofitable for the performing party").
308 See, e.g., Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d
630 (R.I. 1974).
309 See Hillman, supra note 302 (Restatement § 89 and U.C.C. § 2-209 fail as contract modifi-
cation policing mechanisms). But see Johnston, supra note 197, at 383-84 (disagreeing).
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In addition, courts must break free of the language of earlier courts and
recognize that duress can be based on threats of crimes or torts, threats that are
criminal or tortuous, threats of criminal prosecution, threats of bad faith use of
civil prosecution, and bad faith within an existing contractual relationship.
Parties making such threats prove themselves blameworthy. When such
blameworthiness creates a contract that is the product of significantly con-
strained choice, justice is best served by not enforcing the contract. Here the
freedom of contract bows to the rightness of not enforcing the contract because
the constraint is significant enough to undermine the theories supporting the
public policy in favor of freedom of contract. Also, the threatener's blamewor-
thiness robs that party of the legitimate expectation that a court will enforce the
contract, or others like it.
Also, any attempt to use the duress doctrine as a direct regulator of the
substantive fairness of deals should be abandoned. Courts have rejected such a
role in general and have rejected such a role for the duress doctrine even in the
face of urging by commentators and the Restatement itself. Ultimately, courts
should find duress if, as a result of an improper threat as defined earlier in this
piece, 3 1 a party to a contract had no reasonable alternative but to agree to the
deal.
310 Courts should recognize that the bargaining process is fatally flawed if there is constrained
choice and the constraint is caused by a threat violative of criminal or tort law, a threat violative of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an existing contractual relationship, a threat that is a
bad faith use of civil process, or a threat to pursue criminal prosecution. See supra section V.D.
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